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The last quarter of the 20th century produced dramatic changes in the
legal landscape with respect to the resolution of legal disputes. Courts began
to offer procedures that served as alternatives to the then-default trial. Today,
disputes are increasingly being transferred from court dockets to mediation,
arbitration, 2 or some other alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedure
that is "court-connected," or required or advised by the court. Although the
growth in court-connected ADR has undoubtedly changed how judges work
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1 In mediation, a neutral third party assists disputants to reach a negotiated
settlement of their differences. The mediator is not empowered to render a decision or to
make findings of fact. LEONARD L. RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 15
(3d ed. 2005).
2 Typically significantly more formal than mediation, arbitration involves the
submission of a dispute to a third party (or a panel of third parties) who acts as a fact-
finder and renders a decision after hearing arguments, including opening and closing
statements, and reviewing evidence. RISKIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 14. Unlike private
arbitration, in which the decision typically is binding, court-connected arbitration
produces non-binding outcomes. Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the
Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST.
L. REv. 165, 188 (2003).
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by reducing trial rates3 and changed the way that lawyers represent their
clients, ADR affects no one more significantly than the disputants
themselves. The disputants-more than anyone else-must endure the
psychological, financial, and other consequences of the outcomes that are
reached.4 And yet, their ability to influence how their disputes are resolved is
often co-opted by the courts to which they turn for assistance. Disputants'
ability to exercise their preferences 5 with respect to which procedures courts
make available to them, or to tailor a given procedure to the particular needs
of their dispute, is extremely limited and, in many instances, altogether non-
existent. Disputants' autonomy is particularly co-opted in courts that offer but
a single ADR procedure, and even more so in courts that make that single
procedure a mandatory prerequisite to trial.6
3 Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial. What the Numbers Tell Us, What They
May Mean, 10 No. 4 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 3, 3-4 (2004) (noting a 60% decline in the
absolute number of trials since the mid-1980s and arguing that increased use of ADR
procedures might have contributed to this phenomenon).
4 This Article focuses on civil law disputants who have little direct experience with
the legal system-typical contemporary civil disputants whose choices have not been
circumvented by a priori contractual commitments to a given procedure, such as through
an arbitration clause.
5 In this Article, the terms "party," "disputant," and "litigant" are intended to refer to
the same subset of legal actors and are used interchangeably. Also, the term "preference"
is intended to be a close kin of "control" in the sense that allowing disputants to exert
their preferences (individually or as a collective when aggregate preferences are deduced
from research and implemented by courts) implies that they have either exerted some
direct or indirect control over program design, or have had some ability to shape a
procedure to suit the particular needs of their dispute.
6 Mandatory programs require parties to participate in ADR, and fail to settle, before
they are permitted to have a trial on the merits. Kevin M. Lemley, I'll Make Him an Offer
He Can't Refuse: A Proposed Model for Alternative Dispute Resolution in Intellectual
Property Disputes, 37 AKRON L. REV. 287, 308-09 (2004). Voluntary programs, by
contrast, offer parties a choice between ADR or trial from the time of filing. Ari Davis,
Note, Moving From Mandatory: Making ADR Voluntary in New York Commercial
Division Cases, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 283, 295 (2006). Many court programs
offer a single ADR procedure, and some of these programs are mandatory. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, A JOINT PROJECT OF THE FED. JUDICIAL
CTR. & CPR INSTITUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 14-19, tbl.1
(1996) (providing examples of district courts that offer a single form of ADR: D. Ariz
(voluntary non-binding arbitration); E,D. Cal. (early neutral evaluation); D. Vt. (early
neutral evaluation); D.D.C. (mediation); and E.D. Texas (mediation)). Early neutral
evaluation in the District of Vermont and the Northern District of California is mandatory
for certain types of cases. Id. at 50-53, tbl.5. See also Timothy Hedeen, Coercion and
Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations are Voluntary, but
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This Article argues that courts should aim to gain greater clarity about
disputants' preferences, and work to deliberately implement those
preferences. To achieve these ends, several factors must align: courts must be
more open to advancing party self-determination, empirical research must
more clearly and reliably illuminate disputants' aggregate preferences than it
has to date, and courts must commit to relying on such research findings to
avoid the pitfalls associated with relying on intuition. Even before empirical
research clarifies aggregate preferences, courts can advance the
implementation of disputant preferences by giving disputants some
autonomy to shape the procedure they will use for their dispute.
With this potential union between research and court policy as a
backdrop, my argument has three parts. First, I present an analytical thesis. I
begin by explaining that court-connected ADR programs encompass several
types of goals, some individual and focused primarily upon augmenting
disputant self-determination, 7 and some systemic and driven mainly by
concerns for institutional efficiency. I then argue that the former concern
ought to be granted more serious consideration by the courts. Courts often
subordinate disputants' needs to the desires of the bench (as well as the bar)
to clear dockets and reduce the institutional costs of disputes even though
empirical studies of court-connected programs suggest that they often fail to
meet these institutional goals. There is, however, empirical support for the
idea that ADR can. advance party self-determination by evoking a sense of
procedural justice (i.e., a sense of fair process), which derives from giving
parties some control over their dispute. 8 This self-determination goal of ADR
could be further advanced if courts granted disputants more autonomy to
exercise their preferences.
Some are More Voluntary Than Others, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 273, 273 (2005) (explaining that
"[w]hile early mediation programs relied on voluntary participation, many courts now
require litigants to try mediation before proceeding to court," and arguing that this has
coercive effects on the litigants).
7 Party self-determination refers to disputants' ability to influence the resolution of
their disputes, for example, by having the "opportunity to participate actively and directly
in the process of resolving their dispute, control the substantive norms guiding their
discussion and decision-making, create the options for settlement, and control the final
outcome of the dispute resolution process." Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-
Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of
Institutionalization?, 6 HARv. NEGOT. L. REv. 1, 17-18 (2001).
8 Procedural justice concerns the fairness of the process or procedures by which
outcomes (i.e., decisions) are made, and may be contrasted with distributive justice,
which pertains to the fairness of the outcomes, with respect to the distribution of rights or
resources. Lisa B. Bingham, When We Hold No Truths to Be Self-Evident: Truth, Belief
Trust, and the Decline in Trials, 2006 J. DisP. RESOL. 131, 147.
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Courts could implement disputants' preferences in several ways. They
could give disputants a voice in the aggregate by determining which
procedures and attributes of procedures disputants generally favor, and
offering programs that align with those preferences. They could also give
disputants individual autonomy by allowing them to shape the procedure that
will be used for their particular dispute. Incorporating disputants' preferences
into court programs in either of these ways would advance party self-
determination. It would also promote procedural justice and provide
institutional advantages, both by increasing the likelihood of outcome
compliance and increasing participation rates in voluntary ADR programs
which, to date, have not achieved the usage rates that many policymakers and
dispute resolution specialists initially expected. To the extent that courts seek
to promote individual values of procedural justice or other values that rely
upon the subjective satisfaction of disputants, it becomes necessary to
understand the preferences of disputants in order to design ADR programs
that accomplish these goals. It also becomes necessary to understand how
courts, as institutions, have the ability to shape their programs to comport
with disputants' preferences.
To that end, the second part of the Article presents a systemic analysis. I
describe the flexibility that courts generally have to shape their ADR
programs, and note that they can choose how much party self-determination
to offer. For example, courts that impose mandatory programs which require
the use of mediation, arbitration, or some other form of ADR offer relatively
little opportunity for the exercise of preferences. In contrast, truly voluntary
ADR programs, which allow parties to select and shape the procedure they
use, embody a purer exercise of preferences. Given the flexibility that courts
enjoy, they should be clear about what values they seek to promote and
carefully consider how different program attributes-whether participation in
ADR is mandatory or voluntary; whether adjudicative or nonadjudicative
procedures are offered; whether a single procedure or a menu of procedures
is offered; and how much disputants can shape the procedure they will use-
might implicate those values.
The third part of the Article presents a long-overdue synthesis of past
research and offers a methodological critique. I demonstrate that many
existing empirical studies of disputants' preferences suffer from
methodological limitations that restrict their usefulness with respect to
program design in modem civil courts. On balance, the initial research,
conducted primarily in the 1970s, suggests that disputants favor adjudicative
procedures (e.g., arbitration) to nonadjudicative procedures (e.g., mediation).
The more recent literature tends to suggest the opposite. What to infer from
these conflicting findings remains inconclusive because of the vastly
divergent methodologies used across studies. The most promising
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explanation concerns when disputants are asked to evaluate procedures-
whether it is at the beginning of the dispute resolution process (ex ante) or
after they have experienced a given procedure (ex post). That is, disputants
might evaluate different procedures differently depending on when in the
dispute resolution trajectory their preferences are assessed.
Insofar as courts could greatly improve their programs by attending more
to aggregate disputants' preferences, we need to think more critically about
how empirical research can be used to provide clearer information about
what those preferences are. To that end, I present an agenda for future
research. I propose that researchers study preferences in more nuanced ways
than previous research methodology has accomplished. For example, rather
than asking research participants to indicate how attractive they find
procedures that are labeled, for example, "mediation" or "arbitration,"
researchers should present them with an extensive list of options
corresponding to different features of procedures (e.g., options regarding
who will determine the outcome, how the process will be shaped through
conversation and the presentation of evidence, and which kinds of
substantive rules or norms will be used to guide the outcome) 9 and ask them
to evaluate each option. By offering participants descriptions of procedural
feature options rather than descriptions of procedures in toto, the
9 Unlike in trials where the rules of law pervade, some ADR procedures allow
disputants to choose which substantive rules, norms, or standards to use as a basis for
resolving their dispute. Donna Shestowsky, Procedural Preferences in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: A Closer, Modern Look at an Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y &
L. 211, 225 (2004). They might opt to rely on the law, industry standards, norms
established by their past dealings, their own sense of fairness, or other factors such as
each disputant's relative ability to pay. See, e.g., JAY FOLBERG & ALISON TAYLOR,
MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION
10 (1984) (explaining that disputants involved in mediation have the freedom to tailor the
outcome to their personal values and norms because the process does not operate under
the constraints of legal precedent); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case
for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 461, 485 (2007)
(explaining that "[i]n theory, every party wishing to include an arbitration agreement may
negotiate the precise terms of every aspect of the ensuing arbitration," and that they
commonly "incorporate by reference an existing set of publicly available arbitration
rules, with perhaps a few modifications or details relevant to their particular dispute").
See also Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology,
2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 81, 95 ("The question of whether (and when) people prefer dispute
resolution based on public legal norms to dispute resolution based on ad hoc privately
negotiated norms unfortunately has not been subjected to much investigation to date. This
seems like a grievous lack to me, because the assumption that people prefer treating
disputes as problems to be solved, rather than as conflicts to be resolved according to
publicly adopted norms, is central to mediation ideology.").
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distinguishing characteristics of procedures can be made more
psychologically accessible and concrete to the laypeople l0 making
assessments. Courts can then use such data to understand which feature
options disputants find particularly appealing and tailor their procedures
accordingly. Researchers should also borrow the analytical benefits of
laboratory experiments by using random assignment to conduct field
research. Moreover, they should begin to examine differences between ex
ante and ex post preferences, which may differ considerably and may
implicate the values that one seeks to promote in designing an ADR program
in dramatically different ways.
Ultimately, I argue that it is necessary both to design studies that
eliminate the limitations of earlier research, and to understand the difference
between ex ante and ex post disputant preferences-analytically (in
explaining what values we care about), systemically (in understanding how
those values are implicated by different ADR programs), and
methodologically (in designing empirical research that will provide courts
with relevant and reliable data on contemporary preferences).
Throughout this analysis, I draw on the psychology of dispute resolution
from the disputants' perspective. Importantly, I do not suggest that the
subjective preferences of disputants should be the only factor that courts
consider when designing their dispute resolution programs. As a general
matter, preferences are psychological factors that should be considered in
conjunction with efficiency considerations (i.e., cost and time), along with
broader policy concerns. However, although implementing party preferences
has significant value in its own right in light of the originating goals of ADR,
advancing these subjective preferences might also further efficiency and
related institutional goals. At minimum, if disputants tend to find certain
procedures especially attractive, then courts can encourage the use of such
procedures without facing the dilemma of whether to encourage citizens to
use procedures that will probably not satisfy them, irrespective of whether
those procedures save time or money.1' In other words, courts ought to be
aware of any tradeoffs involved in the procedural choices they invite
disputants to make, be they financial, psychological, or of some other
genre. 12 Ideally, it would be possible to identify procedures or attributes of
procedures that meet the institutional needs of the courts (while also
10 In this Article, the term "laypeople" refers to people who are not members of the
legal profession.
11 See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Disputant Concerns in Mediation, 3 NEGOT.
J. 367, 368 (1987) (making a similar argument).
12 Id
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maintaining their statutory and constitutional obligations) 13 and the needs of
those who bring their conflicts to court. Procedures that are institutionally
efficient and subjectively palatable to disputants would be the ideal. 14 Before
discussing how we can come to better understand disputants' preferences it
helps to consider in detail why we should care about what disputants want in
the first place.
I. ANALYTIC THESIS: WHY SHOULD WE CARE ABOUT DISPUTANT
PREFERENCES?
The importance of implementing disputants' preferences in court-
connected ADR derives from both historical and pragmatic concerns. A
concern for disputants' needs meshes with a core originating goal of the ADR
movement-offering parties more self-determination over the resolution of
their conflict than is available through the traditional trial process. Moreover,
courts that advance party preferences can expect particular pragmatic
benefits to accrue. For example, it should increase participation in voluntary
ADR programs, and, because it would cultivate a sense of procedural justice,
it should also improve voluntary compliance with outcomes. These benefits
would in turn support another originating goal of court ADR-greater court
efficiency.' 5 Each of these reasons is discussed below.
13 Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1205, 1262-63 (2000) (arguing
that when disputants make individualized requests to the courts, courts should grant only
those requests that align with their statutory and constitutional authority).
14 Naturally, parties to the same dispute might differ in what procedure they prefer.
However, empirical studies on this issue, though limited, and surveys of lawyers, suggest
that opposing lawyers often favor the same procedure. See Bobbi McAdoo & Art
Hinshaw, The Challenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney
Perspectives on the Effect of Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REv. 473,
581 (2002) (finding that only 24% of lawyers had at least one case, over a 29-month
period, in which they and opposing counsel could not agree on which ADR procedure
was appropriate). But see Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court:
The Impact of Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REv.
401, 426 (2002) (finding that 57.5% of metropolitan area lawyers had at least one civil
case, over a two-year period, where they and opposing counsel could not agree on which
ADR procedure was appropriate, compared to 41.5% of non-metropolitan lawyers).
15 For a discussion of efficiency, see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text. Note
that efficiency is commonly discussed in terms of reduced court dockets, increased
settlement rates, and reduced costs to the courts. Although ADR has generally not been
shown to produce such results, it has been shown to improve voluntary compliance with
outcomes, which is another way one can measure efficiency. Sylvia Shaz Shweder,
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A. The Goals of Court-Connected ADR Programs
In order to appreciate the relative importance that courts should attach to
disputants' needs, it helps to understand the duality of purposes typically
associated with ADR-one focused on the courts, in terms of greater time
and cost efficiency; the other more focused on disputants, largely in terms of
party self-determination. 16
These substantially different goals are the products of the multi-
dimensional history of modem ADR, which has several strands.' 7 One
strand, known as the "community justice movement," provides historical
support for focusing on the needs of disputants, is and dates back to the
community empowerment movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s.18 Its
proponents regarded formal legal institutions, such as the courts, as
mechanisms for maintaining the power of the elite, allowing them to exploit
the less powerful members of society. 19 Community justice advocates argued
Judicial Limitations in ADR: The Role and Ethics of Judges Encouraging Settlements, 20
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 51, 53-54 (2007). Increased outcome compliance can improve the
institutional efficiency of the courts because durable outcomes mean fewer trials de novo
and less need for court enforcement of agreements resulting from ADR procedures.
16 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Lawyer as Consensus Builder: Ethics For a
New Practice, 70 TENN. L. REV. 63, 88 (2002) (noting that "the animating impulse behind
most of the 'ADR movement' has advocated for client choice in dispute resolution and
'self-determination' in mediation"); EDWARD BRUNET ET AL., ARBITRATION LAW IN
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESsMENT 4-7 (2006) (discussing party autonomy as the
fundamental value of arbitration); Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy Welsh, Court-Connected
General Civil ADR Programs: Aiming for Institutionalization, Efficient Resolution, and
the Experience of Justice, in ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, 33 n. 188 (Donna Stienstra &
Susan M. Yates eds., 2004) (noting that although self-determination is most frequently
discussed in connection with mediation, it is also associated with ADR more broadly);
Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little [Good] Faith: Questions, Concerns and Commentary on
Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL. 367, 396
(noting that "[e]mpowerment and ADR go hand-in-hand. Autonomy and ADR go hand-
in-hand. ADR promotes such democratic values as self-determination and freedom from
interference by the state"); Caroline Harris Crowne, Note, The Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 1998: Implementing a New Paradigm of Justice, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1768, 1784 (2001) (noting that ADR operates "in the sphere of disputant self-
determination"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Will We do When Adjudication Ends? A
Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1618 (1997) (elaborating on
the duality of goals associated with ADR).
17 Hensler, supra note 2, at 170-71.
18 Id. at 170.
19 Id.
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that in order to take control of the direction of their lives and communities,
people needed to create grassroots justice institutions that applied
community-based norms and used community members to resolve conflict.20
This idea has been echoed by modem ADR scholars who argue that disputes
in some sense belong to disputants, and that they should control how their
conflicts are resolved.21 A primary goal of ADR, they argue, is to provide
greater disputant self-determination relative to trial. 22 In this view,
disputants' subjective assessments and preferences are key.
As community justice centers were evolving outside the court system, a
new movement was evolving within the courts23-one that was focused on
promoting ADR for efficiency-related institutional reasons. After World War
11, the "laissez-faire judicial system" whereby judges managed "their
assignments without much supervision from other judges," and, sometimes
relegated case management control to lawyers, was heavily scrutinized.24
20 Id. Community justice organizations tended to prefer mediation and other
nonadjudicative procedures and reject the use of formal legal norms. Id at 171.
21 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical
and Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2689-90
(1995).
22 See Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and
Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REv. 873, 879 (2002) ("Proponents of
alternative.., dispute resolution often argue its chief value is disputant control over the
process."); Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR Services by
Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 715, 726 (1999)
(explaining that some "believe that the primary goal is to increase the parties'
involvement in, power over, and sense of responsibility for the resolution of their
problems. The phrase 'party self-determination' is used in some quarters to capture the
spirit of these kinds of purposes"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an
Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR," 19 FLA. ST. U.
L. REv. 1, 6 (1991).
In the 1960s, as part of several other social movements advocating more democratic
participation in our various social institutions, a variety of groups urged that dispute
resolution should more fully involve the participants in disputes. This would allow
individuals to make their own decisions about what should happen to them. Thus, a
model of community empowerment, party participation, and access to justice was
championed by those concerned with substantive justice and democratic process.
This 'movement' resulted in the funding and support of 'neighborhood justice
centers' and a variety of more indigenous community dispute resolution centers-
many of these justified on the grounds of increased participation and access to
justice.
Id.
23 Hensler, supra note 2, at 174.
24 Id.
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Critics argued that "courts needed to adopt a more business-like approach to
using public resources, including judge time."25 Decreasing court budgets,
combined with increasing case filings, sparked the "court management"
revolution 26 which popularized the use of professional "court administrators"
to assist judges in managing their calendars. 27 Courts began to experiment
with different approaches to preparing cases for trial and expediting
resolution; the goal for many courts was to save time and money.28 To that
end, many courts adopted mandatory non-binding arbitration and mediation
in an effort to reduce the time required to resolve civil cases involving
smaller amounts in controversy. 29 By removing these cases from judicial
dockets, they expected to make judges more available for larger cases. Some
scholars have suggested that, beneath the surface, these purported
institutional goals were simply a socially desirable way of protecting the true
motivation for ADR in some courts-judges' desire to control their dockets
and choose which cases they would hear. 30
25 Id.
26 Id. (noting that civil cases in the federal courts more than doubled from 1959 to
1976).
27 Id.
28 Dorothy Wright Nelson, ADR in the Federal Courts--One Judge's Perspective:
Issues and Challenges Facing Judges, Lawyers, Court Administrators, and the Public, 17
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 9 (2001) (cataloging the values associated with court-
connected ADR programs and concluding that "efficiency and reducing cost and delay
appear to be the values that account for much of the interest of the courts"); Judith
Resnik, Mediating Preferences: Litigant Preferences for Process and Judicial
Preferences for Settlement, 2002 J. DIsP. RESOL. 155, 162 ("That press of business-the
docket-is typically proffered as the central variable in the story of judicial promotion of
alternatives [to litigation].").
29 For example, the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 urged courts to adopt ADR as
a means to reducing costs and time to disposition of civil cases in the federal courts. See
generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION
OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996).
30 Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts,
76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 892-95 (1991) (arguing that "[s]upport for ADR as a means to
control court dockets pervades the federal judiciary"); Judith Resnick, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376-80 (1982) (arguing that whereas judges used to have
a disinterested approach to the cases they heard, the newer "case management" paradigm
makes it more likely that judges take an active role in deciding which cases to hear).
Empirical research has found that since ADR use began to increase in the mid 1980s, the
type of cases heard in federal courts has changed from predominantly torts to
predominantly civil rights. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials
and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 485
(2004). Because this kind of analysis between general ADR usage and types of cases
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In establishing their programs, many contemporary courts echo these two
core originating values of ADR. The preambles of statutes and local court
rules that establish some court programs suggest that their primary goals are
to improve court efficiency or save money. The local rules of New Jersey, for
example, state under the section entitled "Purpose, Goals" that the program is
"intended to enhance the.. .quality and efficacy" of the judicial process. 31
Similarly, the Utah ADR Act states that its
purpose is ... to promote the efficient and effective operation of the courts
of this state by authorizing and encouraging the use of alternative methods
of dispute resolution to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of civil actions filed in the courts of this state. . .ADR
procedures will reduce the need for judicial resources and the time and
expense of the parties.32
By contrast, other programs recognize the importance of disputants'
subjective perceptions in addition to more efficiency-related goals. For
example, Colorado's Dispute Resolution Act provides for mediation not only
"for the prompt resolution of disputes" but also to allow "each participant, on
a voluntary basis, to define and articulate the participant's particular problem
for the possible resolution of such dispute."33 Hawaii's legislature created an
ADR center in order to "help reduce public and private costs of litigation and
increase satisfaction with the justice system."34 The statute establishing ADR
in West Virginia expresses a similar set of concerns. It not only mentions a
''growing concern" about "limits on access to justice arising from court case
backlog, delays and costs," but it also acknowledges the importance of
"perceptions regarding the appropriateness and effectiveness of court
procedures" and explains that "the continuation and growth of these
heard by courts is correlative, it should be interpreted as suggestive, but not dispositive,
of possible underlying causative effects.
31 N.J. CT. R. 1:40-1, available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/rules/rl-40.htm
(last visited Apr. 1, 2008).
32 UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 lb-3 (2007). Some state constitutions also uphold
institutional values. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. STATE COURT RULES, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULES Intro. (West 2007) (stating that the "Georgia Constitution of
1983 mandates that the judicial branch of government provide 'speedy, efficient, and
inexpensive resolution of disputes and prosecutions.' As part of a continuing effort to
carry out this constitutional mandate the Supreme Court of Georgia established a
Commission on Alternative Dispute Resolution").
33 COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-22-305 (2007).
34 HAW. REV. STAT. § 613-2 (2006).
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procedures is important in enhancing the quality of life for the citizens of this
state." 35
Particularly interesting is how the two underpinning motivations appear
to be associated with different probabilities of program success, where
"success" is defined in terms of how well these underlying primary goals are
met. Specifically, it appears as though programs aimed at promoting the
subjective satisfaction of disputants are more likely to achieve their goals
relative to programs that attempt to promote more institutionally driven aims
related to efficiency or cost-saving.36 Many courts expect that the net effect
of instituting an ADR program will be greater efficiency in terms of a
reduction in the average costs and time required to process civil lawsuits. As
is often true, however, what sounds good in theory seems not to have been
borne out empirically. Studies of court ADR programs have generally failed
to find that they save significant amounts of either time or money.37
35 W. VA. CODE § 55-15-1 (2007). See also IDAHO CIV. RULE 16.5(a)(1), available
at http://www.id.uscourts.gov/docs/ADR.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007) (stating an
intent "to improve parties' access to the dispute resolution process that best serves their
needs and fits their circumstances"); Local Rules of the Super. Ct. of Cal., Alameda
County § 6.1, available at www.alameda.courts.ca.gov/courts/rules/chapter6.pdf (last
visited July 16, 2007) (stating both efficiency and party benefits as goals); Welsh, supra
note 7, at 3-4 (analyzing Florida and Minnesota state mediation laws that attempt to
safeguard party self-determination).
36 Deborah R. Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass Half Empty: The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1587,
1593-94 (1995).
Interestingly, empirical research on the outcomes of court-annexed ADR procedures
suggests a rather different picture of the costs and benefits of these procedures than
either ADR proponents or opponents have anticipated. The efficiency
gains.., appear mixed... [b]ut the gains in quality of process, at least as assessed
by the disputants, appear significant ... In sum, while the main impetus for ADR in
the court context appears to be a desire for efficiency-that is, reductions in cost and
delay-the parties' reactions to ADR speak more to the objectives of gaining control
over the litigation process that have been associated with the enthusiasm for ADR
expressed by the community justice movement and the corporate community.
Id.
37 See E. ALLAN LEND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAKES CASES: AN EVALUATION OF
COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN A UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT V (1990); Lisa B.
Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy Research Program on Dispute
Resolution, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 119-20 (pointing out that many studies have
examined the effect of court-connected ADR programs on judicial case processing and
indicating that they usually have failed to find that ADR affects court efficiency);
Dayton, supra note 30, at 896, 915-16 (reviewing research comparing "ADR and non-
ADR districts with respect to a number of important factors that serve as a measure of
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whether ADR has been successful as a court management tool," and concluding that the
"comparisons conclusively show that ADR has not resulted in speedier resolution of
federal civil cases, has not reduced backlogs, and has not affected the incidence of civil
trials"); id. at 894-95 (discussing the few controlled experiments concerning ADR and
their findings that ADR does not appear to significantly increase disposition rates or
decrease court costs); Susan K. Gauvey, ADR's Integration in the Federal Court System,
Mar./Apr. 2001 MD. B.J. 36, 43 (reviewing empirical research and noting that
"researchers and commentators in ADR have been reluctant to declare victory, finding
little hard evidence to date that ADR has solved the problems of cost and delay, which
spawned interest in ADR"). Michael Heise reported the results of an empirical study of a
subset of one year of civil cases from 45 of the nation's 75 most populous counties and
concluded that the:
Results ... suggest that a case's referral to ADR increased the case's disposition
time in a statistically significant manner. Paradoxically, among the principal
rationales for ADR programs is a desire to reduce the costs and delays associated
with the formal legal system, particularly trials. However, blunting any surprise with
this finding is that it comports with prior empirical research on the effects of ADR
policies on civil trial disposition time, notwithstanding the goals sought through
ADR or its proponents' wishes.
Michael Heise, Justice Delayed? An Empirical Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time,
50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 846 (2000). See also Deborah R. Hensler, ADR Research
at the Crossroads, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 71, 74-76 (describing RAND study which found
no "significant differences in time to disposition or litigation costs between cases that
were referred" to ADR and ones that were not and noting policymakers' surprise and
negative reactions to these results); Deborah R. Hensler, Court-Ordered Arbitration: An
Alternative View, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 399, 408 (noting that "[t]he primary objective of
court-ordered arbitration is to divert cases from trial-the key to saving time and money
for courts and private litigants alike," but concluding, on the basis of a review of
empirical studies, that "most court-ordered arbitration programs do not significantly
reduce the number or the rate of trials"); James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and
Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial Case Management under the Civil Justice Reform
Act, 49 ALA. L. REV. 17, 38 (1997) (reporting an empirical study and noting that the
absence of a finding that ADR influences time or cost is "consistent with the results of
prior empirical research on court-related ADR"); Robert J. MacCoun, Unintended
Consequences of Court Arbitration: A Cautionary Tale from New Jersey, 14 JUST. SYS. J.
229, 230, 242 (1991) (citing studies of arbitration and noting that "arbitration is likely to
divert many more cases from settlement than from trial. The net affect can actually result
in an increase in delay and congestion in the courts"); Craig A. McEwen, An Evaluation
of the ADR Pilot Project, 7 ME. B.J. 310, 310-11 (1992) (describing a study in which
15% of the total civil docket entered ADR, and finding no discernible impact on the
overall court docket); Tom R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social
Science Perspective on Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 871, 877-82 (1997)
(noting that "[ADR] does not produce aggregate economic savings for the courts" and
that "mediation and arbitration do not generally save disputants time and money"). But
see Mary Ann P. Koch & Carol R. Lowery, Evaluation of Mediation as an Alternative to
Divorce Litigation, 15 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAc. 109, 112-13 (1984) (showing that
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Although it has been shown that the trial rate has diminished since ADR has
become more widespread,38 the empirical evidence to-date offers little
support for the idea that ADR reduces docket overload or promotes court
efficiency.39 That is, courts offering ADR are as busy as ever with trials,
although they may now simply be focusing their time on a different subset of
cases.40 There is little support for the view that court-connected ADR has
reduced the average time to disposition for civil lawsuits, or the average
mediation costs about 10% less than conventional litigation); Bobbi McAdoo, All Rise,
the Court is in Session: What Judges Say about Court-Connected Mediation, 22 OHIO ST.
J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 377, 394-95 (2007) (finding that judges in Minnesota reported that
ADR contributed to a reduction in judicial workload); Art Thompson, The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Civil Litigation in Kansas, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
351, 356-57 (2003) (noting that data suggest that ADR saves court time and some judges
report a 50% reduction in their domestic docket after mandatory mediation programs
were implemented); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, EVALUATION OF THE
EARLY MEDIATION PILOT PROGRAMS 27-31, 66 (2004),
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/empprept.pdf (last visited Nov. 15,
2007) (finding that use of ADR was associated with a reduction in time to disposition and
expense to litigants and reporting that "[i]n San Diego, the total potential time saving
from the pilot program was estimated to be 521 trial days per year (with an estimated
monetary value of $1.6 million); in Los Angeles, the potential saving was estimated to be
670 trial days per year (with an estimated monetary value of approximately $2 million)")
(last visited Nov. 15, 2007). Court-connected arbitration also is not typically
economically advantageous to disputants because lawyers tend to charge them
comparably for arbitration or trial. Roselle L. Wissler & Bob Dauber, Court-Related
Arbitration Access, if Not Efficiency, DIsP. RESOL. MAG. 35 (2007). The disputants are,
however, spared the cost (due to court fees) and time (due to back-log) associated with
trial. Hensler, supra note 2, at 178. Some scholars have argued that ADR can actually
increase costs to disputants because ADR sometimes imposes an additional procedure on
them, triggering higher attorney fees. McAdoo, supra, at 382. This scenario is most likely
to arise when court-connected ADR fails to produce settlement, and the parties
subsequently proceed to trial. See MacCoun, supra, at 235; Ettie Ward, Mandatory
Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States Federal Courts:
Panacea or Pandemic?, 81 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 77, 92 (2007) (noting that "some programs
require parties to pay for court-annexed ADR either directly or as a potential sanction for
rejoining the queue to trial. It is ironic that parties who opted to litigate rather than to pay
for private dispute resolution may be required to pay in any event before being allowed to
use the public 'free' dispute resolution traditionally offered by courts. For cases that are
unresolved by court-annexed ADR and continue to trial, parties incur additional costs").
38 Galanter, supra note 3, at 1 (noting that the trial rate in the federal courts has
dropped despite a fivefold increase in the number of case filings).
39 See infra notes 43-48 for a review of the relevant literature.
40 Galanter, supra note 3, at 2 (suggesting that the types of cases heard in federal
courts has changed since the 1980s, switching from predominantly torts to primarily civil
rights).
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public (or private) expense to litigate cases. Instead, results from empirical
studies have tended to undercut some core institutional goals associated with
the implementation of court-connected ADR programs.
By contrast, the more psychological disputant-focused goals appear to be
more readily achievable. Research has rather consistently shown that ADR
subjectively appeals to ordinary citizens. They regard ADR procedures as
fair and value them for providing an opportunity for voice and process
control which promote self-determination. 4 1 Such findings are consistent
with a long line of psychological studies in the procedural justice paradigm,
which explores the criteria people use to assess legal (and other)
procedures. 42 In fact, procedural justice or process fairness considerations
have been found to dominate the evaluations that citizens make of the
courts. 43 Thus, ADR seems particularly well-suited to advancing disputant-
related values.
41 Welsh, supra note 7, at 19-21; William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant
Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW. & SOC'
REV. 661, 698-99 (1985) (reporting empirical research suggesting that procedures
operating without the formalities of the rules of evidence are able to provide citizens with
expressive satisfaction which they are often denied in court). Similarly, authors of a study
evaluating the fairness of the New Jersey special education mediation system state:
[P]roponents maintain that mediation can reduce the time, expense, and
emotional cost of special education disputes and that mediation can reduce the
impact of resource disparities to effect fairer outcomes. Our findings do not
support such optimistic views of the benefits of mediation. The traditional focus
of research regarding mediation concentrates on the requisites for short-term
mediation success: reaching agreement, serving disputant goals, and producing
immediate disputant satisfaction. More recent research suggests that parties'
viewing the process as fair and feeling they had an opportunity to voice their
concerns are more important to long-term success.
Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Goldberg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special
Education Disputes? First Empirical Findings, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 60 (1997)
(emphasis omitted).
42 For a definition of procedural justice, see supra note 8.
43 See Tom R. Tyler, Public Trust and Confidence in Legal Authorities: What Do
Majority and Minority Group Members Want from the Law and Legal Institutions?, 19
BEHAV. Sci. & L. 215, 233 (2001) (reporting four large-scale studies of laypeople's
perceptions of courts and legal authorities, and concluding that perceptions were not
primarily associated with outcomes or outcome-related judgments like cost or speed, but
with how fairly they feel such entities treat people); Roger K. Warren, Public Trust and
Procedural Justice, CT. REV. FALL 2000, at 12, 13 (commenting on a line of empirical
research and concluding that "[a]lthough ... the public expresses great dissatisfaction
with the high cost of access to the courts and the slow pace of litigation, it is not
primarily those factors, but rather the fairness of court processes, that is associated with
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As Judge Wayne Brazil has argued, the consequences of different court
motivations can be dramatic.44 Courts that focus on institutional efficiency
often evaluate their programs primarily by their impact on settlement rates.45
When they assess the value of their programs in this manner, they pressure
the neutrals in their programs to "elevate ends over means; that is, to care
more, perhaps appreciably more, about 'getting a deal' than about how they
conduct themselves" in the process.46 These courts often promote settlement
at the expense of the procedural justice that their programs might otherwise
provide-a consequence considerably at odds with the primary needs of the
parties, whose primary interests tend to be unrelated to efficiency or cost
savings.47 Thus, the kind of program that most favors the bench is also likely
to be the type which has little long-term appeal to the disputants.
varying levels of public trust" in the courts). But see DAVID B. ROTTMAN ET AL.,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, PERCEPTIONS OF THE COURTS IN YOUR
COMMUNITY: THE INFLUENCE OF EXPERIENCE, RACE AND ETHNICITY 53 (2003), available
at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPerceptionsPub.pdf (last
visited Nov. 15, 2007) (conducting study of random sample of adults, and an additional
sample with court experience during the preceding 12 months, and finding that efficiency
was generally no more important than fair treatment, except for those who had
experienced the courts directly. For this sample, ratings of perceived fair treatment
explained more of the variability in evaluations of the courts than did efficiency ratings).
44 Wayne D. Brazil, Should Court-Sponsored ADR Survive?, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 241, 266-68 (2006) (contrasting disputant-oriented and docket-oriented ADR
programs in terms of their motivations and values).
45 Id. at 266.
46 Id.
47 Issues of delay and the cost of litigation, which can be avoided by early
settlement, have been found to have little impact on party satisfaction with case
outcomes. E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEW OF
TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES v
(1989). A recent National Center for State Court study also supports this view. See
ROTTMAN ET AL., supra note 43, at 53-54 (reporting a study of a random sample of 954
adults and an additional 570 adults with court experience during the preceding twelve
months, and finding that efficiency was no more important than fair treatment, but that
after experiencing the court system directly, ratings of perceived fair treatment explained
more of their evaluations of the courts than did efficiency ratings). See also E. Allan Lind
et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants' Evaluations of Their Experiences in the
Civil Justice System, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 953, 984 (1990) ("[T]hose who argue for
procedural innovations often assert that the reduced cost and delay they hope to achieve
will produce greater litigant satisfaction and greater feelings of fairness. Our findings
show that reduced cost and delay, however desirable in their own right, cannot be
counted on.").
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The converse, however, is unlikely to be true-that is, attention to the
subjective satisfaction of disputants is unlikely to frustrate institutional aims.
It is probably not a coincidence that some programs that are widely regarded
as ones that respect disputants' autonomy also happen to be ones that have
been shown empirically to be time- and cost-efficient. 48 A good example is
the program offered by the Superior Court of San Mateo County, California,
a court well-known in the ADR community for offering disputants choice. It
is a role model in this regard for several reasons. First, it is a voluntary
program. Second, it offers "multi-option" ADR, which provides parties with
several procedures from which they can choose. Third, parties in its civil
program can also select their own neutral. 49 For example, disputants opting
for mediation can choose between mediators who have a background in law,
and ones that have a different orientation for resolving conflict (e.g.,
counseling). Fourth, parties have wide latitude in determining at what point
in the dispute resolution trajectory ADR should be used. Fifth, the program
offers pro bono and modest-means assistance to parties who are indigent or
need help with ADR fees, thereby giving them the option to use ADR for
their dispute. Sixth, it collects evaluations of the program from the parties, in
addition to the lawyers and neutrals. Altogether, such program features signal
strong respect for disputants' preferences . A study of this program found that
it also succeeded in reducing the amount of court time in 93% of cases.50
48 Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and the "Vanishing Trial": The Growth and Impact
of "Alternative Dispute Resolution," 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 843 (2004)
(arguing that where there has been evidence of cost and time savings in some court-
connected ADR programs, "it is evident that much depends on the shape and structure of
such programs"). See also infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text. See generally
Floyd Feeney, Evaluating Trial Court Performance, 12 JUST. SYS. J. 148, 159 (1987)
(describing research suggesting that "decisions perceived as unfair are economically
inefficient because of the increased resistance" to them.).
49 Interview with Sheila Purcell, Program Director, Multi-Option ADR Project,
Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo (Jan. 8, 2007) (reporting that parties
in the court's civil program can select their own neutrals either from the court's closely
screened list, which includes attorneys, non-attorneys, and retired judges, or from some
other source, provided it is someone who is mutually agreed upon and stipulated to by the
parties).
5 0 ROSARIO FLAGG & ADR STAFF, SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF
SAN MATEO, MULTI-OPTION ADR PROJECT EVALUATION REPORT JULY 2002-JULY 2003
16-17 (2005), available at http://www.sanmateocourt.org/adr/evaluations/l --Evaluation-
Introduction.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2007) (stating that based on attorney reports, in
2002-2003, ADR reduced the amount of court time in 93% of cases, and disputants' costs
were reduced as a result of ADR in 83% of cases). Similarly, the Early Neutral
Evaluation (ENE) program in the Northern District of California, another court known
for promoting party autonomy, has been associated with marked financial benefits for the
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Thus, the program succeeded not only in promoting disputant self-
determination, but also in meeting institution-focused goals. The reasons why
implementing party preferences can positively affect both disputant- and
institution-focused values is the topic to which we now turn.
B. Expected Benefits of Attending More to Disputant Preferences
Implementing disputants' preferences in court programs has several
important expected benefits. First, it can enhance party self-determination, a
goal of ADR that distinguishes it from formal adjudication. Second, it can
promote procedural justice. Courts that mandatorily impose ADR, for
example, might significantly increase procedural justice by ensuring that the
procedures they offer comport with aggregate lay preferences (as suggested
by empirical research), or by facilitating the individualized shaping of
procedures by disputants, case-by-case. The positive institutional
consequences of high levels of procedural justice documented in other
domains are likely to emerge in the court-connected context-for example,
improved voluntary compliance with outcomes. Third, at a time when many
researchers and scholars are lamenting the low usage rates of voluntary
court-connected ADR, greater attention to what disputants want from ADR
might increase participation in such programs, which would also help to
advance the institutional goals of the courts. Each of these expected benefits
of implementing disputants' preferences is explored in detail below. 51
1. Improved Party Self-Determination
Party self-determination is a cornerstone principle of ADR.52 As
Caroline Harris Crowne has argued, the paradigms of adjudication and ADR
are supposed to be distinctly different. 53 She labels these two paradigms of
parties and their lawyers. Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay Folberg, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: An EmpiricalAnalysis, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1487 (1994). In an evaluation
of this program, one third of the attorneys surveyed reported decreased costs. Id. at 1500.
The median savings by attorneys was $10,000 and $20,000 by the parties. Id. For a
description of ENE , see infra note 68.
51 The goal of this Article is not to argue whether increased use of court-connected
ADR is normatively good or bad. Rather, I proceed from the assumption that courts want
to promote the use and effectiveness of their ADR program and analyze how they might
achieve these goals by attending more to disputant preferences, and the empirical
research on such preferences.
52 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
53 Crowne, supra note 16, at 1769.
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dispute resolution the "public-service model" and the "customer-service
model. '54 The procedural characteristics of adjudication and ADR
demonstrate that they are designed to serve the interests of two different
constituencies: the public and the customer, respectively. 55 The hallmarks of
adjudication, uniformity and transparency, allow for the imposition of legal
standards and appellate review.56 These characteristics in turn make judges
responsive to public interests, by limiting individual discretion and requiring
compliance with common norms and public laws. 57 By contrast, the
trademarks of ADR are flexibility and privacy. 58 These characteristics should
make neutrals responsive primarily to the disputants-the actual "customers"
of their services. 59
As discussed above, a core originating goal of the ADR movement was
to empower individuals and provide them with greater self-determination
over the resolution of their legal conflicts. 6 0 The social dynamics of program
design (wherein disputants' perspectives are often muted) and
decisionmaking with respect to the use of ADR for a particular case (where
courts often override disputants' desires by directing subsets of cases to a
particular procedure) have, however, eclipsed this intended focus of ADR.6 1
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1777.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Crowne, supra note 16, at 1769.
60 See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
61 Lela P. Love & James B. Boskey, Should Mediators Evaluate?: A Debate
Between Lela P. Love and James B. Boskey, I CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1,
1 (1997) (arguing that "in the field of ADR, where the expectation was that an increased
acceptance of mediation by the courts and the legal profession would simply decrease
the adversarial nature of legal disputes, it appears that it may have also unintentionally
increased the legalistic and adversarial nature of the mediation process" because of the
increased involvement of legal professionals and institutions); Penny Brooker &
Anthony Lavers, Mediation Outcomes: Lawyers' Experience with Commercial and
Construction Mediation in the United Kingdom, 5 PEPP. DisP. RESOL. L.J. 161, 172-73
(2005) ("[R]esearchers have found that attorneys dominate court schemes ... the self-
determination of the parties is being, [sic] overridden by the use of evaluative mediation,
which lawyers are said to prefer."). Nancy Welsh argues that:
even as most mediators and many courts continue to name party self-determination
as the 'fundamental principle' underlying court-connected mediation, the party-
centered empowerment concepts that anchored the original vision of self-
determination are being replaced with concepts that are more reflective of the norms
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The relative lack of emphasis on disputants' needs meshes with the ongoing
debate over the proper role of party self-determination in dispute resolution.
In the context of this debate, Lisa Bingham has argued that we should refine
our notions of self-determination: "in addition to [considering] self-
determination over process and outcome in the individual case, we need to
start examining who has control over design of the dispute system as a
whole." 62 As she notes, a number of leading scholars have written about what
self-determination might mean at the case level, especially in regards to
mediation. 63 For example, disputants might exercise self-determination at the
case level by deciding for themselves which type of mediation to use
(evaluative, facilitative, or transformative), and how much they will
communicate with the other party either directly or indirectly through their
lawyers. 64 Importantly, however, relatively little scholarly discussion has
and traditional practices of lawyers and judges, as well as the courts' strong
orientation to efficiency and closure of cases through settlement.
Welsh, supra note 7, at 5.
62 Bingham, supra note 37, at 102.
63 Id. at 104-05 (reviewing the relevant literature); Welsh, supra note 7, at 6
(emphasizing the need to "clarify the meaning of 'self-determination' and to develop
effective mechanisms to protect it," because of the "institutionalization of court-
connected mediation"); Robert A. Baruch Bush, "'What Do We Need a Mediator For? ":
Mediation's "Value-Added"for Negotiators, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 34 (1996)
(arguing that "evidence shows clearly that disputants place great value on the degree and
quality of participation" in mediation and that mediators should place less emphasis on
evaluation and more on empowering the disputants).
64 In fact, the evaluative-facilitative-transformative mediation debate arguably
revolves around the issue of how much self-determination parties should have in terms of
both process and outcome. See Bingham, supra note 37, at 102. In essence, this debate
concerns how a mediator should mediate. In evaluative mediation, mediators share their
own perceptions of how the case would be evaluated if it were presented at trial, in order
to help the parties understand the advantages and disadvantages of proceeding to trial
rather than settling the case. Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations,
Strategies, and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 7, 26
(1996). They may also propose and defend outcome alternatives. Id. By contrast,
facilitative mediators facilitate a negotiation between the parties without presenting their
own views on the case or generating possible outcome alternatives. Id. at 28.
Transformative mediation differs significantly from these two models. See generally
ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994)
(explaining the transformative approach to mediation). Instead of seeking resolution of
the immediate problem, transformative mediators aim for the empowerment and mutual
recognition of the parties more broadly, thereby attempting to transform them as
568
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addressed self-determination at the program design level, wherein disputants
might have a voice as to which procedures a court offers in the first place. 65
Currently, court-connected programs typically provide disputants little
opportunity to have a voice in determining which procedures are offered
(program-design level) or to shape the procedure that will be used for their
dispute (case-level). In mandatory programs, the courts effectively make
program design choices for the parties.66 Courts that require ADR and then
specify a neutral, a list of neutrals, or a single standard of practice, also
essentially allocate major system design choices to themselves. 67 Similarly,
party control is greatly limited when courts offer non-binding arbitration,
Early Neutral Evaluation ("ENE"), 68 or summary jury trials, 69 and prescribe
individuals. Id. It is not the primary mode of mediation in any court-connected program.
Id.
65 Bingham, supra note 37, at 104. Bingham has argued that "[s]ince the leading
professional organizations approved Model Ethical Standards at a time when courts had
already implemented mandatory mediation programs, it is reasonable to conclude that the
drafters had in mind self-determination as to outcome at the individual case level." Id.
See also WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETT, & STEPHEN GOLDBERG, GETTING DISPUTES
RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO HANDLE CONFLICT (1988); Corinne Bendersky,
Culture: The Missing Link in Dispute Systems Design, 14 NEGOT. J. 307 (1998)
(advocating the tailoring of corporate dispute resolution systems to the company's culture
and examining similarities between explicit policy-driven dispute resolution and implicit
methods of dispute resolution); see generally Cathy A. Costantino, Using Interest-Based
Techniques to Design Conflict Management Systems, 12 NEGOT. J. 207 (1996)
(advocating the use of "interest-based" design in which those who develop programs
facilitate design by working with all of the stakeholders). Early work by Ury, Brett, and
Goldberg, who studied collective bargaining grievance procedures as a model of a
dispute system, suggests obtaining input from the potential users of the system, for
example, through focus groups. WILLIAM URY, JEANNE BRETr, & STEPHEN GOLDBERG,
GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS TO HANDLE CONFLICT 69 (1988); see
also Gina Viola Brown, A Community of Court ADR Programs: How Court Based ADR
Programs Help Each Other Survive and Thrive, 26 JUST. Sys. J. 327, 329 (2005)
(arguing that the lack of public awareness is a continued obstacle for the use of ADR and
that if disputants are not knowledgeable about ADR, their access depends on their
lawyers, many of whom are unaware of or misunderstand it).
66 In some jurisdictions, however, courts are authorized by the legislature to
mandate a certain procedure. Bingham, supra note 37, at 104.
67 Id. at 123 (arguing that when mediation is forced on the parties, self-
determination in system design is generally lower than when the parties voluntarily elect
to mediate their case on an ad hoc basis).
68 Early Neutral Evaluation ("ENE") is a non-binding process by which the parties
make presentations early in the litigation process to a neutral evaluator-generally a
private lawyer with expertise in the subject matter of the dispute. RISKIN ET AL., supra
note 1, at 17 (2005). The neutral then identifies the strengths and weaknesses of each
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strict rules for how these should be conducted, or place flexibility in the
hands of the neutrals, without obligating them to solicit input from the
parties. 70
To further analyze how programs might promote disputant self-
determination, it helps to conceptualize the construct as existing on a
continuum. In the court-connected context, the factor that typically varies
across programs with respect to disputant self-determination is process,
rather than outcome. Outcomes produced by court-connected ADR are
typically under the control of disputants by default, because they are usually
non-binding (a disappointed disputant can typically exercise self-
determination by requesting a trial de novo). 7 1 Thus, the variable at issue is
party's case, and offers a non-binding assessment of the merits of the case, Id. Cases not
settled through ENE proceed to trial. Victoria E. Brieant & William N. Hebert, Civil
Practice and Litigation Techniques in Federal and State Courts Developing Legal Issues
and Effective Practice Techniques in Mediation and Arbitration, in AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION 588 (1999).
69 A summary jury trial (SJT) is an abbreviated mock jury trial proceeding. RISKIN
ET AL., supra note 1, at 17 (2005). These proceedings typically take place in a courthouse,
and use individuals who were called for jury duty but not selected for jury participation
as mock jurors. Donna Shestowsky, Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights from
Psychology, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 469, 470-72 (2003). Often, these mock
jurors are not informed until after the termination of the proceeding that their verdict was
merely for settlement purposes, and is therefore nonbinding. See generally Thomas
Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution,
103 F.R.D. 461 (1984) (describing summary jury trial procedures); Donna Shestowsky,
Improving Summary Jury Trials: Insights from Psychology, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP.
RESOL. 469, 470-75 (2003) (describing and critiquing summary trial procedures).
70 Bingham, supra note 37, at 119-20.
71 See ELIZABETH ROLPH & DEBORAH HENSLER, COURT-ORDERED ARBITRATION:
THE CALIFORNIA EXPERIENCE 2 (1984) (explaining that "[t]o avoid the possibility of
abridging constitutional or statutory protections granting litigants the right to a jury trial,
parties may always appeal an arbitrator's award by requesting and receiving a trial de
novo back on the traditional adjudicative track"). Requesting a trial de novo is often
contingent upon payment of a penalty fee, which:
[T]ypically arises in one of three ways: (1) the appellant pays a filing fee for his
appeal; (2) the appellant pays the arbitrators cost of hearing the matter originally; or
(3) the appellant pays his adversary's court costs. Many courts require penalties to be
imposed on the appellant if he fails to improve his position at trial, while other
courts impose them whenever an appeal is filed.
James C. Thornton, Court-Annexed Arbitration: Kentucky's Viable Alternative to
Litigation, 77 KY. L.J. 881, 895 (1989). See, e.g., JENNIFER E. SHACK & DANIELLE
LOEVY, CENTER FOR ANALYSIS OF ADR SYSTEMS (CAADRS), SUMMARY OF COURT-
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control over process. At one end of the spectrum is no self-determination at
all-courts impose a single, specific mandatory procedure on the parties, and
they have no control over the features (i.e., format or style) of that
procedure. 72 An intermediate level of self-determination is exemplified by
mandatory programs in which parties are offered a menu of procedures from
which to choose or where, if a particular procedure is mandated, they are
given considerable flexibility in shaping its features. 73  Full self-
determination is advanced in purely voluntary programs which offer several
procedures and also grant the disputants some autonomy to shape the features
of the procedure they choose. Some courts already practice this type of case-
level self-determination. For example, Alaska's state courts offer a choice
between facilitative and evaluative mediation; 74 Virginia's state courts allow
disputants to choose between facilitative and evaluative mediation provided
that the evaluative aspect does not interfere with disputant autonomy.75 Self-
determination expands even further when disputants have the power to agree
on the timing and scope of the procedure, the identity of the neutral, and the
substantiverules or norms that will be used to resolve the conflict. 76
How a given program can increase disputant self-determination depends
on where it already sits on the continuum. Mandatory programs can convert
to voluntary ones, or transform into a "compromise" between these options in
the form of an opt-out program. 77 Because opt-out programs generally have
CONNECTED ADR IN ILLINOIS (2004), available at
http://www.caadrs.org/studies/adr-summary.htm.
72 Bingham, supra note 37, at 123 (arguing that when mediation is forced on the
parties, self-determination in system design is lower than when the parties voluntarily
elect to mediate their case on an ad hoc basis).
73 Carrie Menkel-Meadow has signaled the importance of party autonomy as
follows: "I have come to the view that almost any dispute would benefit from some form
of ADR exposure, and thus, I have moved from a position of advocating only voluntary
ADR to supporting presumptively mandatory ADR-with party choice about which
proce[dure] should be used." Menkel-Meadow, supra note 16, at 1618.
74 Mediation, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Alaska Court System § B(S)
(1999), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/medguide99.pdf. It is likely that where the
disputants have high self-determination in dispute system design and can control the
choice of mediation model, they will be equally satisfied with whatever model they
choose. Control over the choice is key. This might explain the tendency for most
assessments of mediation in a variety of contexts and programs to produce similarly high
participant satisfaction rates.
75 VA. R. PROF. CONDUCT § 2.11 (d) (2005).
76 Bingham, supra note 37, at 109 (making a similar argument).
77 Voluntary programs tend to produce settlement rates as high as mandatory ones,
but offer the added advantage of increased party self-determination and control. See, e.g.,
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participation rates as high as mandatory ones,78 they do not compromise
trial-rate reduction and similar institutional goals of court-connected ADR. If
research ultimately reveals that disputants in the aggregate favor mediation
for general civil disputes involving friends, family and acquaintances, but
arbitration for the same kinds of cases involving strangers, courts could rely
on such findings to justify offering an abbreviated version of a multi-door
courthouse in which they offer parties the choice from among these
procedures. 79 This kind of multi-option program would greatly promote
disputant self-determination. 80
As Bingham points out, "The jury is still out on what dispute system
design is best, fairest, wisest and most effective in a court setting. Courts
could duck this question and essentially let the disputants answer it."'81
Courts could become a forum for disputants to shape their own system by
giving them choice over the type of procedure, including whether to use
mediation, non-binding arbitration, ENE, or summary jury trial, and which
model of practice to use, for example, evaluative, facilitative or
transformative mediation.82 Insofar as lawyers strongly influence client
decisionmaking with respect to ADR,83 it becomes important that legislatures
and courts protect party autonomy at the front-end by mandating or
suggesting procedures that align with aggregate disputant preferences. They
should then build flexibility into the governing rules so that the parties can
Jeanne M. Brett et al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases
Handled by Four Major Service Providers, 12 NEGOT. J. 259 (1996) (finding comparable
settlement rates for voluntary and mandatory mediation).
78 Bingham, supra note 37, at 119 (noting that opt-out programs have been found to
encourage the use of ADR as effectively as mandatory programs).
79 The "multi-door" courthouse idea originates from Frank Sander's 1976 famous
speech entitled "Varieties of Dispute Processing" that encouraged courts to take a role in
matching cases with appropriate dispute resolution procedures. Frank E.A. Sander,
Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 FLA. L. REv. 1, 12 (1985).
As one researcher has noted: "In the mid-1980s the American Bar Association
established experimental multidoor courthouses in Houston, Tulsa and the District of
Columbia. Those in the District of Columbia and Houston have been made permanent,
and multidoor courthouses have now been established in other jurisdictions." Elizabeth
Plapinger & Margaret Shaw, Court ADR: Elements of Program Design, 10
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LTIG. 151, 152 (1992).
80 Id.
81 Bingham, supra note 37, at 125-26.
82 Crowne, supra note 16, at 1788-89.
83 Roselle L. Wissler, The Effects of Mandatory Mediation: Empirical Research on
the Experience of Small Claims and Common Pleas Courts, 33 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 565,
570 (1997).
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exercise some design preferences on a case-by-case basis. In sum, by giving
party preferences significant weight, either at the program design level, at the
case-level, or both, courts can promote disputant self-determination, which
not only is a core originating goal of ADR but an attribute which supports the
existence of the ADR enterprise as distinct from formal adjudication.
2. Increased Procedural Justice and Compliance with Dispute
Resolution Outcomes
As psychologist Tom Tyler has noted, "[s]ince people typically have had
little experience with various dispute resolution procedures, it might seem
that they would lack clear preferences, since they have no standard against
which to judge the fairness of the various procedures they might
encounter."84 While most laypeople may lack experience with formal dispute
resolution, research has demonstrated that they are not reluctant to express
relative preferences among procedures, or to "rate" the features of
procedures. 85 In fact, laypeople seem to have very clear and strongly held
views about the fairness of various procedures, however they derive those
preferences. 86 Importantly, these views have clear consequences for
laypeople's reactions to dispute resolution efforts, their evaluations of third-
party neutrals and, more broadly, the legal system as a whole.87 The vast
literature that examines how laypeople such as disputants derive
psychological satisfaction from procedures independent of the outcomes of
such procedures falls under the rubric of procedural justice research.
Procedural justice studies of lay preferences for dispute resolution
procedures consistently find that perceptions of fairness moderate those
preferences. That is, people generally formulate preferences for procedures
by first determining which procedure seems most fair and then expressing a
preference for that procedure. 88 Research has also clearly demonstrated,
somewhat counter-intuitively, that assessments of dispute resolution
processes and outcomes are not entirely dependent upon each other.89
84 Tyler, supra note 11, at 368.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 See id at 369 (synthesizing the criteria typically found to contribute to judgments
about the fairness of legal procedures); see also infra notes 175-94 and accompanying
text.
89 Specifically, researchers have found that evaluations of process and outcomes
comprise two distinct factors in principal components factor analysis. Hensler, supra note
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Specifically, perceptions of how fair a procedure is tend to depend as much,
if not more, on process characteristics than on whether particular disputants
"won" their case or were otherwise favored by the outcome.90 Naturally,
people may feel most satisfied when they believe the process was fair and
that it provided them with a favorable outcome.91 But research has shown
9, at 88 n.24 (reviewing the relevant research and observing how this finding surprised
legal professionals). See also E. Allan Lind et al., Voice, Control, and Procedural
Justice: Instrumental and Noninstrumental Concerns in Fairness Judgments, 59 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 952, 957 (1990) (reporting research finding that fairness
judgments were enhanced when participants had an opportunity to voice their opinions
before a decision was announced even when there was no chance of influencing that
decision); Tom R. Tyler, Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the
Meaning of Process Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 80 (1985)
(reporting research suggesting "that voice increases satisfaction, irrespective of whether it
is linked to decision control. In other words, voice without decision control does indeed
heighten judgments of procedural justice. In fact, it does so as much as when voice is
linked to actual decision control").
90 For example, Robert A. Baruch Bush has argued:
There is thus a substantial body of research that answers our question about what
parties value in dispute resolution processes. The most remarkable thing is what the
answer is not. Despite what we might have thought, parties do not place the most
value on the fact that a process provides expediency, efficiency or finality of
resolution. Not even the likelihood of a favorable substantive outcome is considered
most important. Rather, an equally, if not even more highly, valued feature is
"procedural justice or fairness," which in practice means the greatest possible
opportunity for participation in determining outcome (as opposed to assurance of a
favorable outcome), and for self-expression and communication.
Bush, supra note 63, at 20-21 (emphasis omitted). See also DAVID B. ROTrMAN, NAT'L
CTR. FOR STATE CTS., TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: A SURVEY OF
THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYs 25 (2005) (reporting on a study of over 2400 adults from
California and finding that how fair they regarded court outcomes was "secondary to
procedural fairness concerns"); Tom Tyler et al., The Two Psychologies of Conflict
Resolution: Differing Antecedents of Pre-Experience Choices and Post-Experience
Evaluations, 2 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 99, 114 (1999) (reporting
laboratory studies that differentiated between evaluations before versus after
experiencing a procedure and finding that in post-experience evaluations process matters
more than outcome).
91 See Russell Korobkin, Psychological Impediments to Mediation Success: Theory
and Practice, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 281, 322 (2006) (noting the "widespread"
research finding that, "holding outcomes (especially undesirable ones) constant, people
are significantly more satisfied if they rate as 'fair' the process that resulted in that
outcome"); E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 66-70, 205 (1988) (describing laboratory and field studies suggesting that
perceptions of greater procedural justice generally produce perceptions of greater
distributive justice, regardless of whether the outcome is positive or negative, but noting
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that they are also quite satisfied with procedures that yield unfavorable
outcomes so long as they perceive the process as having been fair.92 Thus, by
offering procedures that disputants find fair in terms of process, courts can
increase the satisfaction of disputants who subsequently prevail in some
sense, as well as those who are less personally favored by the outcome.
The procedural justice literature suggests that laypeople's subjective
perceptions of the legal system are critically important for several reasons.
The first is philosophical. Legal scholars have argued that individual choice
or preference is the benchmark of procedural justice, 93 and that if parties
unanimously choose a given procedure for resolving the dispute between
them, then justice requires adoption of that procedure. 94 Moreover, people's
attitudes are important because, to the extent possible, legal decisions should
be based on a consensus of the parties to the dispute about what is just.
Citizens should be able to embrace willingly the resolutions reached in legal
proceedings; they should want to accept those solutions. In other words,
"justice does not flow only from the interpretation of legal doctrines by legal
that some studies show an attenuation of this effect when the outcome is positive and that
it continues to be strong when the outcome is negative).
92 Hensler, supra note 9, at 89. Hensler notes:
[O]ver the past twenty years, a long line of studies of real world disputes have
demonstrated conclusively that Thibaut and Walker's fundamental insight-that
people's judgments about dispute resolution procedures derive primarily from their
perceptions of procedural fairness rather than perceptions of outcome favorability-
is not just an artifact of experimental conditions.
Id. In high-stakes situations, people value fair process even more. See Tyler, supra note
11, at 369.
93 See generally Bruce L. Hay, Procedural Justice-Ex Ante vs. Ex Post, 44 UCLA
L. REV. 1803 (1997). See also Bingham, supra note 22, at 880 ("Self-determination
includes procedural justice notions of a disputant's perceptions of control and fairness.");
Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem with Contractarian Theories of
Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 490-91 ("The ex ante argument holds that a
procedure is fair if all parties would have agreed to the procedure had they been able to
contract for it in advance of ('ex ante') their dispute.").
94 By way of example, Bruce Hay has argued:
Suppose we are deciding between two possible dispute resolution procedures, called
A and B. Under my approach, if a given individual would choose A over B, then
justice to that individual is satisfied by adoption of A; and if all affected individuals
prefer A to B, then justice to those individuals requires adoption of A.
Hay, supra note 93, at 1803. He then focuses his analysis on the dilemma that arises
when people change their preferences-for example, by preferring one procedure for
dispute resolution in general, before a dispute arises, and then a different procedure once
he or she is personally involved in an actual dispute. Id. at 1809.
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scholars, judges, and/or philosophers, who tell people what is a just solution
of their problems." 95 Justice also develops from the concerns, needs, and
values of the people who bring their problems to the legal system.96 In this
sense, the parties "own" their dispute and should shape the process that will
be used to resolve it. 97 Although the legal system and society more generally
have legitimate interests in the interactions of citizens and the reduction of
conflict, those interests should not preclude concern about the more
individualized needs of the disputants. 98
Second, attending carefully to disputants' preferences makes good
political sense. As political scientist Austin Sarat has noted, "it would be
strange, indeed, to call a legal system democratic if its procedures and
operations were greatly at odds with the values, preferences, or desires of the
citizens over a long period of time." 99 Court programs that focus primarily on
meeting the needs of the judges in terms of docket reduction, rather than the
needs of the courts' constituents, are likely to foster discontent and
mistrust. l00 There is recent evidence of a public "crisis of confidence" in the
95 Tyler, supra note 37, at 874.
96 Id. at 869-902. See also Wayne D. Brazil, Court ADR 25 Years After Pound: Have
We Found a Better Way?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 93, 99 (2002) (arguing that the
subjective perceptions of disputants are an important consideration in evaluating ADR
programs "because how people feel about their governmental institutions is so important
in a democracy").
97 Id. at 97 ("Because it is the time, money, and sense of fairness of the parties that is
primarily at stake, it is not obvious why courts should not give the parties the opportunity
to decide for themselves how to weigh, in any given case, these sometimes-competing
values.") (emphasis in original); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 21, at 2690 (explaining why
disputants should be regarded as the "owners" of their disputes).
98 Tyler, supra note 37, at 875 (making a similar argument).
99 1d. at 871-72 (quoting Sarat).
100 Judge Wayne Brazil has articulated this point well:
[A] preoccupation with reducing docket congestion... can impose pressures on
neutrals and on program administrators that can threaten the quality and integrity of
ADR processes ... It also is bad for the courts that sponsor docket-driven ADR
programs because such programs invite the parties to think that the court's primary
goal is to get rid of them. When the people believe that an institution's goal is to get
rid of them they are likely to resent that institution, not respect it. Thus, docket-
driven ADR programs can make the people feel alienated from their public
institutions and from the democracy those institutions run. A very different picture
emerges when... instead of looking primarily inward, toward themselves,
courts.., look primarily outward, toward the people. The preoccupation in these
courts is not with institutional self-protection but with serving the people.
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legal system' 0' and a negative public impression of the courts.10 2 This public
sentiment is problematic because the smooth functioning of the legal system
depends on respect from the citizens. 10 3 This is so because, "while some
coercion by authorities is possible, the legal system relies heavily on the
voluntary cooperation of most citizens."10 4 Importantly, empirical research
has shown that disputants are more likely to voluntarily comply with the
outcomes of legal procedures when those outcomes are produced by
procedures that disputants regard as fair, where "fairness" entails their having
some meaningful level of control over process. 10 5 Studies by McEwen and
Wayne D. Brazil, The Center of the Center For Alternative Dispute Resolution, 6 PEPP.
Disp. RESOL. L.J. 313, 315-16 (2006). Brazil further argues that:
Courts that permit efficiency values to drive them into offering only one kind of
ADR process, with that one being assertively evaluative, not only lose or reduce
their capacity to be responsive to a range of case-specific circumstances and a
variety of party interests and needs (both practical and psychological), they also
increase the risk of party disaffection.
Brazil, supra note 96, at 123.
101 Barbara J. Pariente, A Profession for the New Millennium: Restoring Public
Trust and Confidence in Our System of Justice, 74 FLA. B.J. 50 (2000) (arguing that lack
of public confidence is due both to misunderstanding the courts and the courts' failure to
meet citizens' needs); Tyler, supra note 37, at 872 (explaining that interviews with the
public suggest that the American justice system is suffering from a crisis of public
confidence); NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE
COURTS: A 1999 NATIONAL SURVEY (1999), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/ResAmtPTCPublicViewCrtsPub.pdf
(reporting on a large-scale study of the U.S. adult population, which found that only 23%
had a "great deal" of trust in the courts in their communities, but finding that a majority
of those polled had a "very high" confidence in judges).
102 Martha Neil, Half of US. Sees "Judicial Activism Crisis": ABA Journal Survey
Results Surprise Some Legal Experts, 4 ABA J. REPORT 40 (Sept. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.abanet.org/joumal/redesign/s30survey.html; Gary M. Stem, Polishing the
Image: Lawyers Appear Low in Public Status, Moving Some Bar Groups to Action,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l 030821219888 (last visited July 16, 2007).
103 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 110 (1990). See also Nancy A.
Welsh, Stepping Back Through the Looking Glass: Real Conversations with Real
Disputants about Institutionalized Mediation and Its Value, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 573, 606 n.137 (2004) (arguing that "seeking out and listening to the voices of
individual disputants is essential for the maintenance of the legitimacy of the various
public institutions that now embrace mediation" and citing references noting the
importance of procedural justice in maintaining citizens' respect for the courts).
104 Tyler, supra note 37, at 873.
105 See Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in Maine:
An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REv. 237, 262 (1981) [hereinafter McEwen &
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Maiman, for example, compared mediation to adjudication in small claims
cases in Maine. 10 6 They found that disputants rated mediation more
Maiman, Mediation in Maine] (reporting a study suggesting greater voluntary compliance
for mediation compared to adjudication). See also Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REv. 889, 904-05 (1991). Dayton
notes that:
[D]ata compiled by the Federal Judicial Center show that.., demands for a trial de,
novo are made in a significant percentage of cases referred for arbitration, ranging
from a low of forty-six percent in the Eastern District of New York to a high of
seventy-four percent in the Middle District of Florida and the Western District of
Michigan.
Id.
106 McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Maine, supra note 105. Just over half of the
total sample was offered a choice between mediation and adjudication; mediation was
selected in three-quarters of the cases. Id. at 248. Parties involved in the other cases (just
under half the sample) were directed to either adjudication or mediation. Id. McEwen and
Maiman ascribed the higher compliance rates they found in mediated cases to
psychological forces that arise from the consensual processes involved in arriving at
mediated outcomes. Id. at 263-64. Feelings of outcome legitimacy and obligation, they
argued, are an inherent result of mediation. Id. It was later argued that the differences in
compliance may not have been entirely due to differences in opportunities for consensus-
building, but that compliance was dependant in part upon one of the parties' "making
concessions," whether that be that they admitted they owed some money or other
obligation to plaintiff, made concessions either on the dollar amount of the claim, or
reciprocal obligations or payment schedules. Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman,
Mediation in Small Claims Court: Achieving Compliance Through Consent, 18 L. &
Soc'y REv. 11, 20, 37, 42-43 (1984). See also Neil Vidmar, An Assessment of Mediation
in a Small Claims Court, 41 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 127, 138 (1985).
[T]he compliance data lend some support to the liability-admission hypotheses, but
not unequivocal support. Compliance rates were higher for partial- than for no-
liability cases, but only when cases were adjudicated. The fact that compliance rates
were actually higher for settled than for adjudicated cases, and that there was no
difference between no-liability and partial-liability cases that were settled are
consistent with McEwen and Maiman's (1984) hypothesis. Thus compliance might
be explained by a combination of both hypotheses.
Id. Other studies have also found high compliance rates for mediation. See, e.g., Douglas
A. Van Epps, The Impact of Mediation on State Courts, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
627, 640 (2002) ("Annual surveys conducted by this court regarding compliance rates
with mediated agreements indicate that 95% of the agreements are kept by the parties.").
But see Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in Small Claims Court: The
Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 323, 348-51 (1995)
(finding that defendants were only marginally more likely to comply with the specific
monetary award or agreement than were defendants who adjudicated to resolution, and
that those who mediated their disputes did not differ from those who experienced
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favorably than adjudication. In particular, in 44% of the mediated cases both
parties viewed the settlement as fair, while only 24% of the parties who
experienced adjudication viewed their procedure as fair. Further, parties were
more likely to comply with mediated settlements-7 1% fully complied with
mediated outcomes while only 34% fully complied with adjudicated ones.1 0 7
By implication, it seems as though the fairness attributed to the mediation
process increased the probability that the agreements would be upheld.
Similar findings have been reported in victim-offender mediations in which
victims and offenders have the opportunity to speak relatively informally and
have a voice in developing their own restitution plan. Empirical studies of
these programs suggest that offenders are more likely to comply with the
outcome, and are less likely to reoffend, compared to those who participate
in procedures that grant them less control. 10 8 Thus, there are solid pragmatic
reasons for attending seriously to disputants' subjective evaluations; 0 9 court-
connected programs that grant parties some level of meaningful process
control are likely to be perceived as fair, which can promote voluntary
compliance with outcomes.
3. Increased Use of Voluntary Court-Connected ADR
As discussed earlier, ADR programs vary in whether participation is
voluntary or mandatory. 10 Given the growth of ADR programs and the fact
that public perceptions of ADR have grown more favorable over the last
several decades, 1" many scholars have noted with surprise the relatively low
adjudication "in the degree to which they felt obligated to meet the terms of the
agreement or award"); Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil
Cases: What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 641,
695 (2002) (explaining that "Few studies have examined the impact of general civil case
mediation beyond the mediation session. These studies found that mediated agreements
did not increase compliance or reduce subsequent disputing compared to non-mediation
resolutions but did result in fewer filed appeals").
107 53% fully complied in cases which were adjudicated following an unsuccessful
mediation. McEwen & Maiman, Mediation in Maine, supra note 106, at 262.
108 Mark S. Umbreit, Robert B. Coates, & Betty Vos, Victim-Offender Mediation:
Three Decades of Practice and Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 298 (2004).
109 See Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 216-23.
110 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
111 See Thomas C. Waechter, Survey Says: Litigants Like What They See in
Mediation, 22 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LrrIG. 93 (2004) ("Mediation, as
well as other forms of alternative dispute resolution, is gaining popularity in the United
States every year."); Maureen A. Weston, Reexamining Arbitral Immunity in an Age of
Mandatory and Professional Arbitration, 88 MINN. L. REV. 449, 449 (2004) (noting a rise
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participation rates in voluntary programs. 112 One reason for low usage might
be that disputants are not being offered options that appeal to them.1 3 That
is, if participation in voluntary programs is low, then the procedures in those
in arbitration use over the past 10-20 years); Robert W. Rack, Jr., Thoughts of a Chief
Circuit Mediator on Federal Court-Annexed Mediation, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL.
609, 614 (2002) ("Federal judiciary statistics indicate that the percentage of district court
civil cases that settle or voluntarily dismiss has risen from 11.2% in 1981 (the year the
Sixth Circuit started its program) to 48% percent now, and the number of federal civil
trials has dropped approximately 36% in the last five years."); Michael A. Landrum,
Through the Mists: ADR and Product Liability Claims in the Twenty-First Century, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 713, 727 (2000) ("[T]he societal trends toward personal
empowerment and accountability, coupled with the aspect that life is moving with
continually escalating velocity, generating impatience with ponderous decision-making
processes, militates toward a greater public acceptance of ADR processes in product
liability cases."); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211, 218 (1995) ("It is fair
to say that, within a very short time period (less than two decades), Frank Sander's call
has been heard. It is worth mapping that shift, from disinterest and some hostility toward
ADR to the embrace of it as a mode of responding to disputes.").
112 Louise Phipps Senft & Cynthia A. Savage, ADR in the Courts. Progress,
Problems, and Possibilities, 108 PENN. ST. L. REV. 327, 329 (2003) ("Historically,
voluntary mediation programs have not been well attended."); Roselle L. Wissler, When
Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study of the Role of Different Forms of ADR
Education and Experience in Attorneys' ADR Recommendations, 2 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 199, 202 (2002).
Despite the increasing number of court-connected ADR programs and participants'
generally high levels of satisfaction with ADR, programs that depend on voluntary
participation attract relatively few cases. For instance, 350 divorce cases were
mediated in Maine during one year when child custody mediation was voluntary,
compared to 4,918 cases mediated during one year after mediation became
mandatory. Cases are less likely to enter ADR at the parties' request than as the
result of a judicial referral, a pre-dispute contractual agreement between the parties
(e.g., private binding arbitration), or a statute or court rule mandating ADR use in
cases involving a certain subject matter or dollar [range].
Id. It is interesting to note that when courts institute voluntary ADR programs, such
programs can have a tertiary effect of increasing the use of private ADR in their
jurisdiction. Bobbi McAdoo et al., Institutionalization: What Do Empirical Studies Tell
Us about Court Mediation?, 9 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 8 (2003) (noting that judicial activism
and mandatory mediation leads to increased voluntary use of private mediation by
lawyers).
113 Presumably, when presented with a range of alternatives and asked to choose
from among them, people will choose the alternative they prefer. But see David M.
Messick & Keith P. Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
418 (1979) (using psychological research to distinguish between fairness, preferences,
and choices in the face of alternatives).
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programs may simply not be sufficiently strong competitors relative to trial.
To increase participation, courts should direct greater energy towards
determining what would attract disputants, which would involve a close
empirical examination of their preferences.
One might argue that it matters less that courts offer what disputants
prefer given the existence of private ADR providers, working outside the
court-connected system, who might offer exactly what they desire. In fact,
some scholars have argued that certain procedures, namely those that are
more facilitative and interest-based, such as facilitative mediation, are best
left as options existing outside of the court environment.1 14 It is important to
consider, however, that court-connected programs can be free or highly
subsidized by the courts (for example, offering the first three or four hours of
the neutral's service gratis), thereby making ADR more accessible to those
who might otherwise ultimately forego a meaningful resolution of their
conflict.' 15 When courts offer subsidized but unattractive procedures, the less
wealthy disputants are likely to be the ones who end up using them, with
wealthier ones opting for private services. A particularly unfortunate
consequence of this scenario is that these less wealthy constituents of the
courts are likely to face further relative injustice if they are dissatisfied with
the process or the outcome and wish to proceed with a trial de novo, because
they are less likely to be able to afford this follow-up option compared to
their more affluent counterparts. 116 For this reason, courts can promote
114 See, e.g., Hensler, supra note 9, at 97-98.
115 United States District Court for the District of Utah, ADR Program,
http://www.utd.uscourts.gov/documents/adrpage.html (last visited July 16, 2007)
(explaining that in the United States District Court, District of Utah, the neutrals' preparation
time is free and each party contributes $50 per hour if additional time is needed); Superior
Court of California, County of Santa Barbara, Court Administered Dispute Resolution,
http://www.sbcadre.org (last visited July 16, 2007) (explaining that cases with an amount in
controversy that does not exceed $50,000 may be sent to Limited Mediation at court expense
in Santa Barbara, CA); Maryland Judiciary, Local ADR Programs,
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/adr-local.html (last visited July 16, 2007) (listing court
ADR programs in Maryland that offer free services, or accept payments on a sliding scale,
or fee waivers); National Center for State Courts, Small Claims,
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/CourTopics/StateLinks.asp?id=2&topic=SmaCla (last
visited July 16, 2007) (describing several free and reduced-fee ADR programs for small
claims cases across the country).
116 Besides the financial disincentive often associated with requesting a trial de novo,
see supra note 74, there are also other direct financial costs associated with trial (e.g.,
lawyers' fees, payments to expert witnesses), as well as indirect financial costs (e.g., lost
wages). David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72, 91-
92 (1983). It is important to note that even though financial costs have not been shown to be
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access to justice on the part of the less wealthy by marrying the financial
perks of their programs with procedures that are deemed desirable and
fair. 117
Moreover, if we accept the premise that promoting party preferences can
increase party self-determination, procedural justice, and voluntary
compliance with outcomes, it matters greatly which procedures courts offer.
If courts do not respect disputants' needs in meaningful ways, they may end
up tarnishing the very enterprise of court-connected ADR. This is
particularly true for courts that require parties to attempt settlement through
ADR before they can gain access to trial. If, in this context, courts force
parties to use a procedure that they dislike, and adding insult to injury, to pay
for this "opportunity" whereas they would pay nothing for the neutral's time
if they went to trial, one would expect the parties to regard the procedure as
the factor that most influences people's assessment of procedures, see infra notes 160-65
and accompanying text, this is not inconsistent with the fact that the cost of a procedure can
itself be a barrier to ADR (and in that way be the most important factor preventing them
from using it). The latter is a cost issue that arises at the start of a dispute , whereas the
former cost issue arises after the dispute has ended, and applies only to people who have
afforded entry into ADR, used it, and then reported that fair treatment was more important to
them than the financial costs of the procedure, or the money they may have been awarded as
an outcome.
117 As Judge Wayne Brazil has argued:
[O]ne of the very few ways a court can be useful to a substantial segment of the
population is to offer a free or low-cost ADR program. By offering such a program,
a court acknowledges the real-world limitations, for many people, of the services it
traditionally has offered. As important, the court demonstrates that it understands
that its mission is to offer useable and respect-worthy service to as large a
percentage of the people who have judicially cognizable disputes as possible. This
kind of acknowledgment and demonstration earn a court the gratitude and respect of
the people-and gratitude toward and respect for our public institutions is essential to
the long-range health of our polity.
Brazil, supra note 44, at 243. See also Ward, supra note 37, at 92.
Some programs require parties to pay for court-annexed ADR... It is ironic that
parties who opted to litigate rather than to pay for private dispute resolution may be
required to pay in any event before being allowed to use the public 'free' dispute
resolution traditionally offered by courts.
Id. Some argue that "party self-determination" is consistent with improving access to
justice. See Jean R. Stemlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule
of Law? Lessons From Abroad, 56 DEPAurL L. REv. 569, 583-85 (2007) (arguing that
because party self-determination and other core ADR features allow disputants to resolve
issues according to their own preferences outside of formal government structures, these
approaches can "enforce disputants' legal rights").
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relatively unfair, which, in turn, might reduce voluntary compliance with the
outcomes. 118 This, in turn, might land the dispute back in line for trial (if the
parties can afford this option), possibly with greater palpable conflict
between the parties. The effectiveness of the ADR program in terms of
promoting conflict resolution would consequently be compromised, as might
be the disputants' confidence in the legal system.
In sum, there are many solid historical, theoretical, and pragmatic
reasons for implementing party preferences in court-connected ADR. Once a
court commits to promoting disputant-focused values in its program, it must
carefully consider how different program features might implicate those
values. Fortunately, courts generally have the flexibility to then design their
programs accordingly.
II. SYSTEMIC ANALYSIS: CAN COURT PROGRAMS IMPLEMENT
DISPUTANTS' PREFERENCES?
A. Courts Have Flexibility in Program Design
Although legislation in some jurisdictions might require parties to use
ADR for certain types of cases, program design is largely determined by the
118 Brazil, supra note 44, at 261 (suggesting that courts are unfair to disputants when
they offer a neutral's time in adjudication for free but charge for a neutral's time in ADR
procedures, especially when those procedures are mandatory). Litigants at trial do not pay
for the judge's time. See Michael H. Leroy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful
Barrier to Alternative Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory
Employment Arbitration, 50 UCLA L. REv. 143, 160 (2002) (stating that disputants pay
employment arbitrators $2000 a day, unlike judges to whom litigants do not owe a fee).
Some programs mandate high hourly rates for mediator compensation. See, e.g., Rules of
the Circuit Court of Cook County, Rule 20.03,
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/rules/rules/rulespart2O.html#rules20.03 (last visited July
16, 2007) (mandating mediator fees at $250 per hour); United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma, Panel of Mediators,
http://www.okwd.uscourts.gov/files/adr/mediatorlist.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007)
(listing the mediators that are court-approved in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma, along with their hourly fees, many of which are $150, and
as high as $350); Superior Court of California, County of Sacramento, ADR Panel List,
http://www.saccourt.com/civil/ADR/mediation/docs/CV-E-MED-
173%20ADR%2OPanel%20List.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007) (listing the court-
approved mediators for the Sacramento Superior Court, 37% of which list hourly fees of
$300 or higher). See also Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN.
L. REv. 1593, 1620 (2005) (suggesting that negative consequences might arise if courts
decided to finance their ADR systems by charging litigants a low flat fee for services).
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courts at both the federal and state levels. 119 In the federal system, although
the ADR Act' 20 sets out some definite requirements in regards to arbitration,
it leaves much to the determination of individual courts in terms of which
procedures to offer and how to design their programs. 121 Not surprisingly,
the characteristics of programs in the federal courts vary widely. 122 This
diversity is also apparent in state courts. 123. One source of variability across
programs pertains to whether ADR is voluntary or mandatory. Some courts
require the use of ADR, others offer voluntary participation, 124 and still
others sponsor programs that have both mandatory and voluntary
119 Crowne, supra note 16, at 1794-95. For examples of such legislation at the state
level, see infra notes 124-32.
120 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-58 (1998).
121 See Ward, supra note 117, at 84 (noting the wide variety of ADR procedures
offered in the federal courts: "arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary
jury trial, mini-trial, judicial settlement conference, and additional iterations, such as
med-arb"); 28 U.S.C. §§ 654, 655, 657 (providing that courts may not mandate
participation in arbitration and eliminating the binding effect of arbitrations by allowing
either party to request a trial de novo).
122 James R. Holbrook & Laura M. Gray, Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 21 J. CONTEMP. LAW 1, 4-5 (1995). As of 2004, 63 districts authorized
mediation; 28 authorized some form of nonbinding arbitration; and 23 authorized ENE.
See United States Courts, The Federal Judiciary, http://www.uscourts.gov (last visited
July 16, 2007). See also PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 6, at 14-19 (describing in
detail various ADR programs in federal district courts). All of the federal appellate courts
have in-house ADR programs as well. ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION & CONFERENCE
PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS 2 (1997) (finding that pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 33, all thirteen federal Courts
of Appeals have implemented programs to facilitate settlement by a third party neutral);
Jennifer E. Shack and Danielle Loevy, Summary of Court-Related ADR in Illinois,
Center of Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems (2004),
http://www.caadrs.org/downloads/adr_summary.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007)
(describing the application of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 to federal
courts and noting that the "wording allows for great latitude in deciding which process to
use, leading to variations in the types of programs established in each of the U.S. District
Courts in Illinois").
123 See generally Steven S. Clarke et al., NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON COURT-
CONNECTED DISPUTE RESOLUTION RESEARCH (Susan Keilitz ed., 1994); National Center
for State Courts, http://www.ncsconline.org (last visited July 16, 2007).
124 See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Comparing Structures for the Delivery of ADR
Services by Courts: Critical Values and Concerns, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 715,
718 (1999) (noting that court programs vary in whether they are mandatory or voluntary);
PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note 6, at 7-8 (reporting that some federal court ADR
programs are mandatory, whereas others are voluntary).
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components. 125 Although some states mandate arbitration for certain types of
cases, 126 mandatory programs typically sponsor mediation rather than
arbitration. 127 Some courts require mediation for particular types of cases, 128
or require mediation if requested by one party. 129 Others make mediation a
125 See, e.g., Yolo Superior Court, Local Rules of Superior Court of California,
County of Yolo, http://www.yolo.courts.ca.gov/forms/CourtRules.pdf (last visited July
16, 2007) (Yolo County local rules 6.1 and 6.2 indicate that the court offers both
voluntary and mandatory mediation are offered.); Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Superior Court of Delaware,
http://courts.delaware.gov/Courts/Superior/o20Court/ADR/ADR/adrdelaware.htm#d2
(last visited July 16, 2007) (offering both arbitration which is mandatory or by
agreement, and voluntary mediation).
126 Senfi & Savage, supra note 112, at 329. See also Illinois Courts, Court-Annexed
Mandatory Arbitration Annual Report Fiscal Year 2004,
http://www.state.il.us/court/Administrative/ManArb/2004/Arbitration.asp (last visited
July 16, 2007) (explaining that in Illinois, court-connected arbitration is a mandatory,
non-binding form of ADR, subject to damages within certain limits); WASH. ST. CT. R.
16 (2005) (requiring arbitration for disputes involving $35,000 or less in damages);
Deschutes County Circuit Court Supplementary Local Rules, Mandatory Arbitration
Program, http://www.deschutes-court.ojd.state.or.us/Rules/rules.html#13.005 (last visited
July 16, 2007) (imposing mandatory arbitration for all matters involving $50,000 or less);
Albert Yoon, Mandatory Arbitration and Civil Litigation: An Empirical Study of Medical
Malpractice Litigation in the West, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 95, 96 (2004) (explaining that
19 states require pretrial arbitration for medical malpractice claims).
127 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2005) (stating that federal courts cannot order parties to
participate in an arbitration to which they have not agreed). Most federal court ADR
programs offer mediation. See Stipanowich, supra note 48, at 848-49.
128 See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 173 (1994) (providing that mediation must take place when
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services decides to mediate collective bargaining
dispute); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3170 (West 1996) (ordering mediation if it appears that
custody, visitation, or both are contested); IOWA CODE § 598.41 (1995) (allowing courts
to require party participation in custody mediation); CAL. INS. CODE § 10089.75 (2006)
(allowing Commissioner to mandate mediation for insurers in fire or marine insurance
claims); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-71-2408 (2005) (mandating non-binding mediation for
worker's compensation); NEV. REV. STAT. § 3.475 (2005) (mandating mediation for child
custody cases in counties of more than 400,000 residents); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-38.3(c)
(2005) (mandating mediation for farm-nuisance litigation); WASH. REV. CODE
§ 59.20.080(2) (2006) (mandating mediation for mobile home eviction disputes); OR.
REV. STAT. § 107.755 (1995) (requiring mediation in cases where child custody,
parenting time, or visitation are in dispute); see also Holly A. Streeter-Schaefer, A Look
at Court Mandated Civil Mediation, 49 DRAKE L. REV. 367, 378-82 (2001) (identifying
family law, employment disputes, bankruptcy disputes, and medical malpractice suits as
areas of law for which mediation is commonly mandated).
129 See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 205-5.1 (2004) (providing that, if one party
requests mediation, all other parties to the dispute may be required to participate); MINN.
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prerequisite to filing an action. 130 In other instances, the parties are not
compelled to mediate, but suffer negative consequences, such as the loss of
the right to recover lawyers' fees, if they do not. 131 Programs that leave
participation entirely up to the parties are also common. 132 Voluntary
mediation and ENE in the District of Columbia Federal District court, for
example, are based primarily on voluntary submission to ADR. 133 The
Contra Costa County Superior Court is another example of a voluntary
program. It offers several options, including mediation and arbitration. 134
Court programs also vary in the number of procedures they offer.135
Although some courts have embraced the multi-door model, 136 the majority
STAT. § 125 A.26 (1998) (requiring mediation in special education disputes if requested
by one of the parents); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.403 (2005) (stating that, at the request of a
grandparent denied visitation with a minor grandchild, the court may order mediation
with any party who has custody or visitation rights).
130 See, e.g., Nancy G. Maxwell, Keeping the Family out of Court: Court-Ordered
Mediation of Custody Disputes under the Kansas Statutes, 25 WASHBURN L.J. 203, 203
(1986) (describing Kansas statute that allows courts to order parties in child custody
cases to mediate their dispute before resorting to trial).
131 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 723.037-723.038 (West 1988).
132 The Civil Justice Reform Act plans of several other federal districts, including
Massachusetts, Oregon, and Utah, allow parties to select ADR voluntarily. See ERICKA
GRAY, MULTI-DOOR COURTHOUSE 108 (1993), available at
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/KISADROthNatlSympCtDispDoor.pdf.
Some courts require attendance at a conference to discuss the possibility of using ADR
and then offer voluntary participation. See, e.g., W.D.N.Y. LOCAL R. Civ. P.
16.1(a)(3)(F), http://www.nywd.uscourts.gov/document/civilamendments2004.pdf (last
visited July 16, 2007) (requiring counsel for each party to discuss the possibility of
alternative dispute resolution in a pre-trial conference); D.N.D. LOCAL R. Civ. P. 16.2(B),
http://www.ndd.uscourts.gov/pdf/local-rules.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007) ("The court
strongly encourages participation in ADR at an early stage of the case and requires that
the parties, in all civil cases not excluded from application of this rule, discuss early ADR
participation and the appropriate timing of such effort.").
133 Plapinger & Shaw, supra note 79, at 154.
134 CONTRA COSTA COUNTY SUPER. CT. LOCAL. R. 103; Superior Court of California
County of Contra Costa, Alternative Dispute Resolution, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.cc-courts.org/ (last visited July 16, 2007).
135 Stipanowich, supra note 48, at 849. Research compiled in 1996 showed that of
the 94 federal district courts, 23 offered only one ADR procedure. PLAPINGER &
STIENSTRA, supra note 6, at 14. Of the 23 courts that offered a single form of ADR, only
four courts made ADR mandatory. Id. The Northern District of Indiana required that
most civil cases participate in a single mandatory mediation session. Id. at 134. The
Southern District of New York required mandatory mediation for all civil cases involving
money damages. Id. at 199. ENE in the District of Vermont and the Northern District of
California is mandatory depending on the case type. Id. at 51-53.
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is more selective in the procedures offered; most courts offer a single
alternative to trial, typically mediation or arbitration. 137 But some offer two
or more procedures.' 38 They usually retain considerable discretion in
designing the features of these procedures, thereby creating many variants on
the same theme. 139
In addition, programs generally have discretion to offer adjudicative
(e.g., arbitration) or nonadjudicative procedures (e.g., mediation). Mediation
is the most common procedure offered by federal and state courts, but
arbitration is also common. 140 Some courts offer other options, such as
136 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
137 Stipanowich, supra note 48, at 848-49; F. Peter Phillips & Sandra A. Seller, Y2K
and ADR: Alternatives to Litigating Year 2000 Business Disputes, 571 PLI/PAT 999,
1070 (1999) (noting that only a few state courts, including New Jersey, Texas, and
Massachusetts, offer a menu of options); Plapinger & Shaw, supra note 79, at 152
(explaining that some courts institutionalize only one ADR procedure). See also Brazil,
supra note 96, at 123-24 (observing that courts offering a menu of options either refer
almost all civil cases to the menu, or authorize judges to refer selected matters to
particular procedures and noting the potential problems regarding parties' and lawyers'
perceptions of fairness that are more likely to emerge when a program offers a single
procedure).
138 See, e.g., Contra Costa County Superior Court, http://www.cc-
courts.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageld= 1781 &parentlD=1 604&nodel
D=3 (last visited July 16, 2007) (offering four procedures); United States District Court,
District of Idaho, Alternative Dispute Resolution, http://www.idd.uscourts.gov/adr.htm
(last visited July 16, 2007) (offering three procedures); Cook County Circuit Court,
Illinois, http://www.cookcountycourt.org (last visited July 16, 2007) (offering two
procedures).
139 For example, some offer facilitative mediation, whereas others provide
evaluative mediation. See, e.g., NEBRASKA DISPUTE RESOLUTION OFFICE, NEBRASKA
MEDIATION AND ADR HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT STAFF 1 (2006), available at
http://court.nol.org/mediation/pdf/adrhandbook.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007)
(documenting that the "Nebraska regional centers primarily use a facilitative, interest-
based mediation model"); Hon. Pinkie T. Toomer, Probate Court Mediation is Unique in
Georgia, THE FULTON COURT REPORTER (Jan. 2005),
http://www.co.fulton.ga.us/Fulton County/departments/TheCourtReporter Jan 05.pd
f (last visited July 16, 2007) (noting that the Fulton County, Georgia Probate Court sends
nearly every case to evaluative mediation); Shestowsky, supra note 69 (describing
various ways that courts structure summary jury trials). Ward, supra note 37, at 84
(noting that the variety of ADR offered in the federal courts includes "arbitration,
mediation, early neutral evaluation, summary jury trial, mini-trial, judicial settlement
conference, and additional iterations, such as med-arb").
140 Stipanowich, supra note 48, at 848-49 (stating that at least two-thirds of federal
district courts-63 of 94-currently have some form of mediation program and noting
that 28 authorize some form of nonbinding arbitration and 23 authorize ENE); Rachel A.
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settlement conferences, 14 1 summary jury trials, or hybrid procedures such as
Med-Arb. 142
Importantly, courts also vary in whether they allow disputants to decide
which procedure is used, or shape a procedure for their particular dispute.
The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, for example, offers both
arbitration and mediation, but a case's eligibility for each is dictated by court
rules and based on case type and the amount in controversy. 143 Other courts,
like the Superior Courts of Santa Clara County and the County of San Mateo,
California, offer a menu of options from which parties can choose. 144
Disputant control can also vary across courts that offer the same single
procedure. For example, some courts offering mediation mandate the use of
evaluative mediation, whereas others, such as state courts in Alaska and
Virginia, allow the parties to choose between the facilitative and evaluative
models. 145 Some programs allow disputants to select their mediator, 146 a
Wohl, Beyond the Courthouse, 7 No. 4 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 21, 21 (2001) (stating that
over the past 15 years courts in nearly 40 states have created their own offices of dispute
resolution to support various forms of alternative dispute resolution).
141 See generally Jonathan S. Rosenthal, Defining and Understanding ADR Terms,
38 MD. Bus. J. 18, 20-21 (2005) (describing a settlement conference as a conference
where the parties, their lawyers, or both "appear before an impartial person to discuss the
issues and positions of the parties in the action in an attempt to resolve the dispute").
142 Med-Arb is a combination of mediation and arbitration in which the parties agree
in advance that they will mediate for a set amount of time, and that, if the dispute is not
resolved through mediation in that period they will proceed to arbitration. LEONARD
RISKIN ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND LAWYERS 16 (2005). Only two federal districts
have incorporated Med-Arb into their programs. See PLAPINGER & STIENSTRA, supra note
6, at 4 (outlining ADR in federal system).
143 Compare Major Case Court-Annexed Civil Mediation, Circuit Court of Cook
County, Actions Eligible, http://www.cookcountycourt.org/divisions/index.html (last
visited July 16, 2007) (stating that mediation is available only in major civil cases
seeking damages in excess of $30,000) with Non-Judicial Offices, Circuit Court of Cook
County with http://www.cookcountycourt.org/about/non-judicial.htm (last visited July
16, 2007) (stating that the upper limit for eligibility for arbitration is a case value of
$30,000).
144 Santa Clara County Superior Court ADR,
http://www.sccsuperiorcourt.org/civilladr/default.htm; Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, Appropriate Dispute Resolution Programs,
http://www.sanmateocourt.org/adr/index.html (last visited July 17, 2007).
145 Compare VA. R. PROF. CONDUCT §2.1 l(d) (2005); ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL,
MEDIATION, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE ALASKA COURT SYSTEM §B(5)
(1999), http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/medguide99.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007)
with MICH. CT. R. 3.216 (2006) (allowing parties to a divorce proceeding to request an
evaluative mediation).
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feature which has been associated with higher levels of disputant satisfaction
with mediated outcomes and perceptions that the outcomes were fair. 147
Because courts have considerable latitude in program design, they face a
wide range of choices. How do courts ultimately determine the shape of their
programs? Given that it is the disputants who bring their conflicts to the
court, and that disputants are most affected by the process and outcomes
produced by the procedures, 148 one might assume that courts accord great
weight to disputants' preferences. However, a review of available evidence,
presented in the next section, suggests that courts often view disputants'
preferences as a secondary concern at best.
B. Courts Can Make Disputants'Preferences a Greater Priority
The only way to know with reasonable certainty how much disputants'
preferences were prioritized in designing a given court program would
involve analyzing program design meetings or similar records of the program
development process. 149 Such analysis is a goal worthy of future research. 150
146 For example, Cook County in Illinois allows parties to designate a mediator, who
may or may not be on the list of court-certified mediators, see Cook County, Illinois
Local Circuit Rule 20.03(A),
http://www.cookcountycourt.org/divisions/law/mediationl.htm#selection (last visited
July 16, 2007); U.S. DIST. CT., E.D.N.Y. LOCAL CIv. RULE 83.11(b)(2),
http://www.nyed.uscourts.gov/adr/Mediation/LocalRule_831 1_/localrule_831 1_.html
(last visited July 16, 2007).
147 LEILA TAAFFE, SHINJI MOROKUMA, & ELIZABETH ELLEN GORDON, PARTICIPANT
SATISFACTION SURVEY OF GEORGIA'S COURT-CONNECTED ADR PROGRAMS, GEORGIA
OFFICE OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 9-16 (2000), available at
www.godr.org/pdfs/finalsji.pdf (last visited April 22, 2008) (although less than 4% of
disputants surveyed were involved in mediator selection, those who provided input were
more satisfied with the outcome and felt that the outcome was more fair to them.).
148 The present article does not address the societal or precedential ramifications of
settling disputes. For a thoughtful analysis of such issues, see Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). It is important to note that unlike outcomes
produced by the trial process, court-connected ADR outcomes are not precedents.
149 A good example of indirect participation by parties in the program design
process comes from the San Mateo Multi-Option ADR program. Telephone Interview
with Sheila Purcell, Program Director, Multi-Option ADR Project, Sup. Ct. of Ca.,
County of San Mateo (Jan. 8, 2007) (reporting that the court conducted a "needs
assessment" which involved sending surveys to a variety of community organizations and
individuals to solicit their ideas on what the court should do in its ADR program, and it
also used focus groups to obtain feedback on an initial program design).
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Until such research is conducted, however, the relative weight given to their
preferences must be determined by less direct means. A review of these
indirect means suggests that there is significant opportunity for courts to
better prioritize the understanding and implementation of disputants'
preferences. For example, guidelines which suggest that courts place strict
dollar cutoffs for their arbitration programs imply that the needs or
preferences of disputants be subordinated to such concerns.151 Moreover, the
preambles of many statutes and local court rules that establish ADR
programs suggest that a primary goal of many courts is to conserve time and
money.152 Lastly, some reputable sources report that the needs or desires of
the judges in certain jurisdictions have been the driving force behind the
institution of certain ADR procedures.153
150 Future research could determine which factors were actually used in developing
court programs by observing and analyzing program design meeting discussions, or
studying committee minutes or similar reporting devices.
151 Harry N. Mazadoorian, Institutionalizing ADR: A Few Risks, Many Benefits,
Some Guidelines for System Design, 12 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST. LITIG. 45, 45
(1994) (discussing the risk of placing dollar value limits on cases referred to arbitration in
terms of turning away cases that are good candidates for arbitration simply because they
exceed a certain dollar amount). See also supra notes 115 and 143 (listing examples of
courts that limit cases according to their dollar value). In some instances, these cutoffs are
imposed on the courts by the legislature. See WEST'S ANN. CAL. C.C.P. § 1141.11
(requiring superior courts with 18 or more judges to impose arbitration for "all
nonexempt unlimited civil cases.., if the amount in controversy, in the opinion of the
court, will not exceed $50,000 for each plaintiff, but leaving arbitration as an option for
superior courts with fewer than 18 judges and stating that such courts could create local
rules mandating arbitration).
152 For examples, see supra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
153 Marietta Shipley, Family Mediation in Tennessee, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 1085,
1106-07 (noting that ADR is growing among judges in Tennessee and that their interest
in new procedures comes from a desire to be relieved of "repeat customers"); Jennifer E.
Shack & Danielle Loevy, Summary of Court-Related ADR in Illinois (2004),
http://www.caadrs.org/downloads/adr-summary.pdf (last visited July 16, 2007)
(describing ADR in Illinois courts and noting that "Differences in implementation are
often caused by informal arrangements within a circuit, such as in the 18th Judicial
Circuit, where probate cases have been referred to mediation because the presiding
probate judge was a proponent of ADR"); Welsh, supra note 103, at 589 ("In the court-
connected context, this research reveals that mediation programs have evolved largely to
reflect the needs and preferences of judges and attorneys. [B]ecause many judges
perceived mediation as an effective means to resolve cases and reduce congested dockets,
many courts make disputants' participation in court-connected family and non-family
civil mediation mandatory.").
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But perhaps the clearest way to estimate how much weight courts give to
disputants' preferences involves noting whose opinions of their programs
they value. This weight can be assessed by examining whose assessments are
solicited in program evaluations, which ostensibly are intended to obtain
feedback for the purpose of improving programs. On this front, courts appear
more likely to collect data on the attorney's perceptions of ADR than they are
to assess the perceptions of disputants, 154 and when they do assess disputants'
opinions it is often done indirectly by asking lawyers to report their
perceptions of their clients' perceptions, 155 which is a poor substitute for
154 By way of example, in Roselle Wissler's review of 27 evaluations of general
jurisdiction court mediation programs,, only 16 surveyed disputants and 20 surveyed
attorneys; and in her review of 15 appellate mediation programs, only 1 surveyed
disputants whereas 6 surveyed attorneys. Roselle Wissler, The Effectiveness of Court-
Connected Dispute Resolution in Civil Cases, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 55 (2004). See
Wisconsin civil court system ADR program,
http://www.wicourts.gov/about/committees/ppacadr.htm#2 (specifying that lawyers and
Circuit court judges were surveyed); McAdoo, supra note 14, at 403 (explaining that
when the Minnesota Supreme Court directed the State's ADR Review Board to evaluate
its Statewide ADR rule, "the Board chose to conduct an in-depth statewide survey of
attorney opinions, and a review of court case files in four selected districts in the state");
Roselle L. Wissler & Robert W. Rack, Jr., Assessing Mediator Performance: The
Usefulness of Participant Questionnaires, 2004 J. DisP. RESOL. 229, 242-43 (describing a
study of mediator performance, conducted by the Office of the Circuit Mediators for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit which involved distributing" a four-page
questionnaire to all attorneys who had participated in mediation within a given
timeframe").
155 McAdoo, supra note 14, at 411 (evaluation of Minnesota court-connected ADR
gathered data from attorneys regarding client preferences, for example, whether clients
were "more interested in settling and staying out of court, whether clients "like
mediation," and whether mediation "provides greater client satisfaction."); McAdoo &
Hinshaw, supra note 14, at 513-15 (reporting on a study commissioned to assess the
Missouri Supreme Court's revised civil (non-family) ADR rule; the survey asked
attorneys various questions about their clients, including whether clients liked mediation,
whether mediation provided clients with a greater sense of control, and whether
mediation provided greater client satisfaction). Some courts have assessed disputants'
perceptions directly. See, e.g., Administrative Office of the Courts, Evaluation of the
Early Mediation Pilot Programs 4 & 8,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/empprept.pdf (reporting on programs
in the Superior Courts of Fresno, San Diego, Contra Costa and Sonoma Counties where
both "parties and attorneys.., were asked to rate their satisfaction regarding the process
of mediation, the performance of the mediator, the fairness of the mediator, the mediation
process, and the outcome of the mediation and their willingness to recommend or use
mediation again") (last visited July 16, 2007); Superior Court of California-County of
San Mateo, Multi-Option ADR Project (MAP), Neutral Evaluation Guidelines,
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asking disputants directly. 156 Contrasting how regularly a reduction in case
dockets and expenses (not generally of prime importance to disputants) 157 are
cited as important data collection variables is particularly striking. 158
A review of who is surveyed in field research also suggests that
disputants' needs and preferences are often overlooked. As Les Lopes, former
chair of the Metropolitan Board of the Society of Professionals in Dispute
Resolution ("SPIDR") once remarked:
While I was [at a recent] conference ... [a] successful and highly respected
mediator in Florida... began to describe the recent research project she had
completed with a group of colleagues. They had surveyed a large number of
customers and asked them what they expected from their mediators . . .
When I asked who these customers were, she replied, "Lawyers, of course."
Her answer made perfect sense. In the marketplace, the customer is not only
the one who makes a choice, but also the one most likely to make the same
choice again. Thus, the disputants who come and go are not the customer,
http://www.sanmateocourt.org/getforms/forms/localforms/ADR-CV-
4_NeutralEvaluationGuidelines.pdf, (last visited July 16, 2007) ("Submission of Post-
Session Evaluation Forms: In accordance with local rule 2.3(i)(5), the neutral evaluator
and all attorneys and clients shall complete and submit evaluation forms within 10 days
of the session."); Yolo County,
http://www.yolo.courts.ca.gov/forms/Client%20Evaluation%20rev%203-07.pdf (last
visited July 16, 2007).
156 See infra notes 159-70 and accompanying text.
157 Research suggests that a reduction in case-related expenses is not critically
important to typical civil disputants. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
Moreover, research suggests that the effects of monetary outcomes are nonmonotonic.
D.E. Conlon et al., Nonlinear and Nonmonotonic Effects of Outcome on Procedural and
Distributive Fairness Judgments, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1085, 1092-95 (1989).
158 In 2003, the Research and Statistics Task Force of the American Bar Association
Section of Dispute Resolution embarked on a project to help courts use their information
technology to collect the data needed for program evaluation. The Task Force invited
court program administrators to indicate the factors they felt were most important to use
as data collection variables and which ones their court already collected. Ten items
received an average importance rating of five or greater on a scale of one to seven and
were identified as the most important variables for courts to collect. Only one of them
related to the subjective impressions of the parties. In abbreviated form, the items were:
Was ADR used for this case?; What ADR procedure was used?; Timing information (the
date the claim docketed, date of first ADR session, the point in the docket duration that
ADR occurred, and the final disposition date of the case); Did ADR dispose of any
claims?; What precipitated the use of ADR?; Was there a settlement without ADR?; Case
type; The cost of the ADR process (in dollars and time) to the participants and the court;
Whether the disputants used more than one form of ADR; How satisfied the parties and
court were with the process, outcome, and the third-party neutral.
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but rather the lawyers who continually frolic in the murky waters of
conflict, thus changing our very focus of who it is we serve as mediators. In
this case, progress created the opposite of its intended purpose. 159
This example illustrates the broader point that data collection is often
geared towards understanding the preferences of lawyers.160 And, when
researchers do set out to study the preferences of disputants, they often gather
data by asking lawyers to report the perceptions of their clients. 161 That is,
just like in court evaluations, field research often solicits lawyers to report
party reactions to court-connected ADR rather than surveying disputants
directly. This methodology assumes that lawyers can adequately channel
their clients' private assessments, an assumption that is not well-founded.
159 Lela P. Love & James B. Boskey, Should Mediators Evaluate?: A Debate
Between Lela P. Love and James B. Boskey, 1 CARDOZO ONLINE J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1
(1999-2000).
160 Many studies have focused on understanding lawyers' viewpoints. See, e.g., Lisa
Brennan, What Lawyers Like: Mediation, NLJ/AAA Survey: Less Rigid ADR Preferred to
Arbitration, 158 N.J.L.J. 589 (1999) (reporting on a mail survey of "leading litigators"
and "Fortune 500 general counsel"); McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 14, at 475
(reporting on study of lawyers); Eugene R. Quinn, Using Alternative Dispute Resolution
to Resolve Patent Litigation: A Survey of Patent Litigators, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 77, 94 (1999) (reporting on survey of patent litigators). Of course, studying the
perspectives of legal professionals is important in its own right, especially given their role
in informing clients about ADR.
161 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Identifying Real Dichotomies Underlying the False
Dichotomy: Twenty-First Century Mediation in an Eclectic Regime, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL.
371, 389-90 (observing that "studies to-date have been content to measure lawyer
satisfaction as a proxy for party satisfaction"). However, some academic research has
examined what disputants want from dispute resolution. Compare Deborah R. Hensler, In
Search of "Good" Mediation: Rhetoric, Practice and Empiricism, in HANDBOOK OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH IN LAw 231, 254-55 (Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton eds., 2001)
(describing lawyers' process evaluations, and their assessments of how satisfactory and
fair mediation was for their clients) with Deborah R. Hensler, The Real World of Tort
Litigation, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 155, 156-62 (describing
quantitative and qualitative data from tort plaintiffs in ordinary and mass tort litigation,
and concluding that they want to present evidence, find out what happened, and vindicate
their rights); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want?
Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 153-54 (1984) (presenting
research suggesting that once people go to court with their conflicts it is because they feel
they no longer have conflicts of interest they can negotiate; instead, they feel they have a
principal grievance for which they seek an authoritative conclusion). Other academic
researchers have attempted to survey disputants in addition to legal professionals but
failed to get an adequate response rate from disputants. See e.g., Brett et al., supra note
77.
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Lawyers often claim that they can speak on behalf of their clients and that
they understand disputants' needs and interests and thus can make the
necessary judgments about how disputes should be resolved from their
perspective. 162 Possibly because of the cognitive orientation borne from their
adversarial legal training, however, disconnects frequently arise between the
perceptions of legal professionals and disputants. 163 Lawyers commonly fail
to understand or appreciate their clients' experiences, perceptions, priorities,
or interests. 164
162 Welsh, supra note 103, at 578.
163 Id. See also William L.F. Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of
Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 631, 645 (1980) (observing
that professionals often define their clients' needs to match the services they can provide).
Welsh, supra note 161, at 601-02. As noted in one empirical study:
Judges do not appear to consider the maintenance of party relationships or the
development of remedies based on extra-legal (or simply non-legal) norms as
particularly compelling substantive justice objectives. Looking again at the survey
question regarding factors that judges consider when ordering parties to mediation,
few selected either "continuing relationship to preserve." And although it is true that
apologies and other non-legal relief sometimes are achieved in mediation, the data
suggest that these outcomes are not what judges expect, experience or value when
they order parties to mediation.
Bobbi McAdoo & Nancy A. Welsh, Look Before you Leap and Keep on Looking:
Lessons from the Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, 5 NEV. L.J. 399, 415
(2004). Hensler, supra note 9, at 88 (noting that "Perhaps the most startling finding of
procedural justice research for legal experts was the discovery that, contrary to what
many judges and lawyers believe, people's assessments of dispute resolution processes
and outcomes are not wholly dependent upon each other").
164 See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 103, at 601-02 (observing that "attorneys often fail
to hear their clients' experiences, perceptions or objectives"); Marcus T. Boccaccini et al.,
Client-Relations Skills in Effective Lawyering: Attitudes of Criminal Defense Attorneys
and Experienced Clients, 26 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 97, 111-14 (2002) (finding
significant discrepancies between lawyer and client ratings of how important various
lawyering skills were, and reporting that lawyers tended to underestimate the importance
that clients placed on skills that demonstrated concern);; Hensler, The Real World of Tort
Litigation, supra note 161, at 156-63 (contrasting tort plaintiffs' desire for accountability
and vindication of legal rights with lawyers' monetary focus in assessing claims); Jean
Sternlight, Lawyers' Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and
Psychology to Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 269, 320-31 (1999) (describing monetary, non-monetary, and psychological
divergences between lawyers and clients that result in lawyers affecting settlements in
ways that diverge from their clients' self-defined interests); Jeffrey Goldfien & Jennifer
Robbennolt, What if the Lawyers Have Their Way? An Empirical Assessment of Conflict
Strategies and Attitudes Toward Mediation Styles, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 277,
315 (2007) (noting that when lawyers are more likely to evaluate trials in terms of their
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Furthermore, what legal professionals such as lawyers, judges, and court
administrators think is important to disputants often turns out not to be. 165
For example, despite what legal professionals may have anticipated,
economic concerns seem to play at most a minor role in shaping disputants'
attitudes. Empirical evaluations of laypeople's post-experience judgments of
fairness and their satisfaction with the courts have shown remarkably little
relationship to the financial cost of the case or how long its resolution
took. 166 Cost, in particular, is much more weakly related to satisfaction and
financial value, one can expect an unfavorable outcome for clients focused on non-
financial goals); Roselle Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys' Discussion and Use of ADR, 19
OHIO ST. J. ON DISc. RESOL. 459, 467 (2004) (explaining that lawyers paid on a
contingent-fee basis might place less significance on clients' non-monetary goals); Gay
Gellhorn, Law and Language: An Empirically-Based Model for the Opening Moments of
Client Interviews, 4 CLINICAL L. REV. 321, 321-22, 325-26 (1998) (reporting on an
observational study and noting a "striking" tendency for law students to fail to hear or
acknowledge "critical" information revealed to them at the beginning of the initial
lawyer-client meeting, and to express empathy when clients expressed emotions about
their situations, and describing the negative consequences that can result from these
failures).
165 Tyler, supra note 11, at 372 (observing the wide differences between the features
of existing formal procedures and what truly matters to disputants, and arguing that these
discrepancies are the result of the different training and focus of legal professionals). For
example, a recent focus group study of judicial officers and court administrators in
California concluded as follows:
It is important to note that there is a gap-and perhaps a significant gap---between
the assumptions of judicial branch members about how the public perceives the
fairness of the courts and the actual opinions of the public. Many participants in the
judicial member focus groups assume that court users' confidence in or approval of
the courts depends on whether their case outcome was favorable. However [our]
research shows that Californians' trust and confidence in the courts depend less on
the outcome of individual cases than on their treatment and the fairness of the
procedures they see at work in court. Thus, many judicial branch members may
underestimate the critical importance of the perception of procedural fairness to the
public.
TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA COURTS: PUBLIC COURT USERS AND
JUDICIAL BRANCH MEMBERS TALK ABOUT THE CALIFORNIA COURTS, REPORT, JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS 2-3, 34 (2006).
166 LIND ET AL., supra note 47. This research was conducted on disputants after they
experienced a dispute resolution procedure. It is possible that a greater concern for costs
would be reported at the pre-experience stage. See also Tyler, supra note 43, at 233
(reporting four large-scale studies of laypeople's perceptions of courts and legal
authorities, and concluding that perceptions were not primarily associated with outcomes
or outcome-related judgments like the cost or speed of the litigation, but with how fairly
they felt such entities treat people); Warren, supra note 43, at 13 (commenting on a set of
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perceived fairness than legal professionals might expect. In essence, the
compromised ability of lawyers to accurately assess their clients' assessments
is likely due in part to the fact that their own reactions to court-connected
procedures can diverge dramatically from those of disputants.167
As a result of such lawyer-disputant disconnects, lawyers' assumptions
and occasional "imaginary conversations" with their clients cannot help but
be unreliable with respect to discerning correctly what appeals to
disputants. 168 Laypeople's needs reflect a clear and describable psychological
model of concerns. 169 This model "departs substantially from the model of
legal decision-making into which lawyers and judges are socialized in law
school and which dominates discussions about law in law journals and
judicial education conferences."' 170 A gap often exists, then, between
desirable treatment as described by the consumers of the legal system and
studies and concluding that "although... the public expresses great dissatisfaction with
the high cost of access to the courts and the slow pace of litigation, it is not primarily
those factors, but rather the fairness of court processes, that is associated with varying
levels of public trust" in the courts).
16 7 See, e.g., WAYNE KOBBERVIG, MEDIATION OF CIVIL CASES IN HENNEPIN
COUNTY: AN EVALUATION 23-25 (1991) (demonstrating that disputants who used
mediation rated it more favorably than did disputants who experienced adjudication,
while lawyers rated adjudication more highly and were more likely than disputants to
assess adjudication as efficient); Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil
Cases, supra note 106 (pointing out that parties' ratings of the fairness of mediated
outcomes were lower than the lawyers' ratings); Robert J. MacCoun, Voice, Control and
Belonging: The Double-Edged Sword of Procedural Fairness, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 1 (2006) (describing the "surprise" felt in New Jersey courts
when it observed parties shifting cases from bilateral negotiation to more financially
costly arbitration, and reporting the main reason as a relatively greater opportunity for
voice).
168 Welsh, supra note 103, at 579, 665 (suggesting that because disputants enter
mediation to reach some kind of resolution, mediators assume that settlement is the goal);
E. Allan Lind et. al., supra note 47, at 955, 981-82 (explaining that policymakers often
"assume that the only things that matter to litigants, beyond whether they win or lose, are
their litigation costs and the delay they encounter in obtaining a judgment. Indeed cost
and delay are often viewed as the major reasons for litigant discontent with the civil
justice system ... data are available from research in other contexts, however, that raise
questions about the accuracy of these assumptions" and then presenting their own
research on what matters to litigants, drawing a similar conclusion).
169 Tyler, supra note 37 (noting the disconnect between what disputants want and
what the legal system offers them).
170 Id. See also William M. O'Barr & John M. Conley, Litigant Satisfaction Versus
Legal Adequacy in Small Claims Court Narratives, 19 LAW & Soc'Y. REV. 661, 672
(1985) (reviewing data suggesting that people feel frustrated when restrictions are placed
on the way they can tell their story in formal adjudication).
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what legal authorities might assume these disputants want. 171 Insofar as
disputants' perceptions are often assessed and reported indirectly by lawyers,
or program administrators whose intuitions about these preferences also
might be "biased" by legal training, it becomes clear how easily disputant
preferences-even when contemplated at the design stage-might be
misunderstood, distorted, or misapplied.
Specifically, minimizing flawed conclusions about disputants'
preferences requires relying on sound empirical findings about what those
preferences are. This would entail gathering data from disputants directly
rather than relying on third-party intuitions about, or reports of, disputants'
needs. In determining what to offer, courts would do well to reflect on the
advice of Judge Richard A. Posner:
[T]he success or failure of [a proposed alternative to the conventional ways
of resolving legal disputes] must be verifiable by accepted methods of
(social) scientific hypothesis testing. I am unconvinced by anecdotes,
glowing testimonials, confident assertions, and appeals to intuition.
Lawyers, including judges and law professors, have been lazy about
subjecting their hunches-which in honesty we should admit are often little
better than prejudices-to systematic empirical testing. Judicial opinions
and law review articles alike are full of assertions . . . that have no
demonstrable factual basis. If we are to experiment with alternatives to
trials, let us really experiment; let us propose testable hypotheses, and test
them. 172
To the extent that courts seek to promote disputant-related values such as
self-determination, or other values that rely upon the subjective satisfaction
of disputants, such as procedural justice, it becomes especially important that
they understand and implement disputants' preferences. Reliance on sound
empirical research to gain the necessary understanding is critical. To that
end, it helps to synthesize what has been "discovered" thus far about
laypeople's preferences for dispute resolution procedures and point out the
171 Tyler, supra note 37 (noting the disconnect between what disputants want and
what the legal system offers them).
172 Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 366, 367 (1986).
As an example, intuitions and assumptions about the cost and time savings of ADR have
been subjected to empirical investigation and have generally not been supported. Dayton,
supra note 30, at 895 (arguing that Federal district courts have been permitted and
encouraged to devote significant public resources to implementing ADR programs that
are assumed, but have not been shown, to reduce costs and delays).
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important issues in need of empirical clarification. It is to these issues that we
now turn.
III. METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUE: How CAN WE BETTER UNDERSTAND
DISPUTANT PREFERENCES?
A. What We Already Know about Disputants'Preferences
For over three decades, researchers have been investigating laypeople's
preferences and assessments across a variety of conflict situations, including
legal disputes. 173 These studies have generally taken one of two forms. One
form is the laboratory experiment, wherein research participants assess the
attractiveness of various procedures for hypothetical disputes.
A classic example of this experimental research paradigm dates back to
early studies by research psychologist John Thibaut and lawyer Laurens
Walker. These researchers and their colleagues initially focused on
preferences for different forms of adjudication. Using the conventional
experimental method, they compared the procedural preferences of
individuals who were either in front of or behind a "veil of ignorance"
regarding their role in a physical assault dispute. 174 Participants who were
placed behind the veil were not informed of their role (i.e., they were not
assigned the role of "victim" or "defendant"), whereas those in front of the
veil were informed of their role.' 75 The weight of the evidence strongly
favored the victim over the defendant; the defendant was therefore
"disadvantaged" by the facts of the case, whereas the victim was relatively
"advantaged."'176 Participants were given descriptions of the following
procedures: inquisitorial (an activist decisionmaker who is also responsible
for the investigation), single investigator (a moderately activist
decisionmaker assisted by a single investigator who is used for both
disputants), double investigator (a less activist decisionmaker is assisted by
173 For a review of this early social psychological research, see Jeffrey Rubin,
Experimental Research on Third-Party Intervention in Conflict: Toward Some
Generalizations, 87 PSYCHOL. BULL. 379 (1980). See also Donna Shestowsky,
Procedural Preferences in Alternative Dispute Resolution, A Closer, Modern Look at an
Old Idea, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 211, 214-23 (2004).
174 John Thibaut et al., Procedural Justice as Fairness, 26 STAN. L. REv. 1271
(1974). The term "veil of ignorance" was coined by the philosopher John Rawls. The
purpose of the device is to cancel out self-interest in the analysis of hypothetical social
arrangements. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
175 Thibaut et al., supra note 174.
176 Id. at 1276-78.
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several investigators), adversary (essentially adjudication-the
decisionmaker is relatively passive and the process is chiefly controlled by
the disputants through advocates who represent them in an openly biased
way), and bargaining (disputants meet in an attempt to resolve the dispute
without the intervention of any third-party).' 77 The study found that
participants in all roles-whether behind or in front of the veil of
ignorance-liked the adversary procedure best.178 Adversarial representation
induced greater trust and satisfaction with the procedure and produced
greater satisfaction with the outcome, independent of the favorability of the
outcome to the participant. 179 Participants also deemed the adversary
procedure most fair. Notably, they found it to be significantly more just than
procedures that were nonadjudicative (e.g., bargaining).180
Thibaut and Walker argued that preferences for procedures develop from
people's perceptions of which procedures are most fair. In order to ascertain
the fairness of a procedure, people tend to evaluate the distribution of control
that the procedure offers. That is, people tend to find procedures more just
when they distribute control between disputants and third parties in a way
that appeals to them. This analysis provided the basis for explaining earlier
findings suggesting that people prefer adjudicative procedures to
nonadjudicative ones.181
Since Thibaut and Walker's classic studies, laboratory research has
followed a variety of similar formats. Most commonly, participants are
randomly assigned a perspective or "role" (e.g., the viewpoint of the plaintiff
or the defendant) from which to consider the facts of a hypothetical legal
dispute. They subsequently read descriptions of procedures and evaluate the
177 Id. at 1274-75.
178 The decreased preference ordering of the other four procedures differed
according to experimental condition. Id. at 1280. Those in the advantaged role preferred
the inquisitorial and single adversarial model more than did those in disadvantaged role
and those in the disadvantaged role preferred the adversary procedures more than did
those who were disadvantaged. Id. at 1280-81. Moreover, participants in the
disadvantaged role were found to prefer bargaining procedures more than those in the
advantaged role. Id. at 1282. Participants in the disadvantaged role and those behind the
veil indicated greater preference for those procedures that favored the disadvantaged
party, while advantaged participants did not. Thibaut et al., supra note 174, at 1283. The
best predictor of preferences, regardless of experimental condition, was perceived
fairness.
1 7 9 JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 80 (1975).
180 See id. at 113-15.
181 See Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 218-19.
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attractiveness of each for the given dispute. 182 Less commonly, participants
participate in a simulated dispute resolution procedure to which they are
randomly assigned, and then asked to rate that procedure.183
Another common format for procedural preference research is the field
study. In this paradigm, individuals involved in an actual legal dispute are
asked about their experiences. Field researchers generally contact disputants
retroactively, asking them which procedure they used for an already-resolved
dispute and how they would evaluate it.184 Unlike laboratory studies, field
182 See id at 214-23; Regina A. Schuller & Patricia A. Hastings, What do
Disputants Want? Determinants of Procedural Preference, 28 CANADIAN J. OF
BEHAVIOURAL SCI. 130, 135 (1996); Michael W. Morris et al., Person Perception in the
Heat of Conflict: Negative Trait Attributions Affect Procedural Preferences and Account
for Situational and Cultural Differences, 7 ASIAN J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 127, 133-34 (2004);
Stephen LaTour et al., Some Determinants of Preference for Modes of Conflict
Resolution, 20 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 319, 328-29 (1976).
183 See, e.g., Laurens Walker et al., Reactions of Participants and Observers to
Modes of Adjudication, 4 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 295, 300 (1974); William Austin et al.,
Effect of Mode ofAdjudication, Presence of Defense Counsel, and Favorability of Verdict
on Observers'Evaluation of a Criminal Trial, 11 J. APP. SOC. PSYCHOL. 281, 288 (1981);
Stephen LaTour, Determinants of Participant and Observer Satisfaction with Adversary
and Inquisitorial Modes of Adjudication, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1531,
1535-36 (1978).
184 See, e.g., Debra L. Shapiro & Jeanne M. Brett, Comparing Three Processes
Underlying Judgments of Procedural Justice: A Field Study of Mediation & Arbitration,
65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1167, 1170 (1993) (Researchers conducted phone
interviews with 132 of 158 coal miners, 69 of which experienced grievance mediation
and 89 of which had their grievances arbitrated.); Brett et al., supra note 77, at 260
(Researchers mailed post-dispute surveys to disputants and their attorneys and ultimately
examined 449 cases administered in five states by providers of dispute resolution
services; cases included contract, construction, personal injury, property damage, and
environmental disputes.); Lind et al., supra note 47, at 954 (Researchers conducted
telephone interviews of 122 litigants whose cases were tried in Fairfax County, Virginia,
74 litigants whose cases had been arbitrated in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and 90 in
Prince Georges County, Maryland who had participated in judicial settlement
conferences.). One published study surveyed parties earlier in the dispute resolution
trajectory. See Lamont E. Stallworth & Linda K. Stroh, Who is Seeking to Use ADR?
Why Do They Choose to Do So?, 51 DISP. RESOL. J. 30, 33-34 (1996) (Researchers
mailed questionnaires to 3,000 parties with cases pending at the Illinois Human Rights
Commission and offered them alternatives of fact-finding, mediation, or final and binding
arbitration to determine their perceptions of the procedures and which they would choose;
109 employers and 102 claimants responded to the survey.).
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studies generally do not randomly assign participants to procedures, and they
necessarily involve participants responding to different disputes.] 85
There are a multitude of studies across both research paradigms, with
interesting variability in findings. A plethora of experiments have supported
the hypothesis that people tend to prefer more adjudicative procedures, such
as arbitration, to less adjudicative ones, such as mediation. 186 Similarly, the
famous RAND field study of tort cases in three jurisdictions examined tort
litigants' perceptions of procedural justice in settlement conferences,
adjudication, and arbitration, as well as in bilateral negotiation. It found that
real-world civil litigants accorded higher procedural fairness to non-binding
arbitration and trial than to the (less adjudicative) judicial settlement
conference.18 7
However, results from other research sharply contrast with the
conclusion that laypeople generally favor adjudicative procedures. This other
research suggests a preference for nonadjudicative procedures (e.g.,
mediation). For example, Pierce and his colleagues, who investigated
preferences in a landlord-tenant dispute, found that mediation was not only
preferred to arbitration, but it was the most favored procedure involving a
185 This research is not limited to the use of dispute resolution procedures in a court
setting, but neither is the research using laboratory experiments. See Bingham, supra note
37, at 108.
186 See, e.g., Thibaut et al., supra note 174, at 1280; LaTour et al., supra note 182, at
349 (finding that arbitration was generally the most preferred procedure); Pauline
Houlden et al., Preference for Modes of Dispute Resolution as a Function of Process and
Decision Control, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 13, 29 (1978) (concluding that the
most preferred procedure corresponded to arbitration). Other research has also suggested
that adjudicative procedures are regarded as more fair, more satisfying, more accurate,
and unbiased from a post-experience perspective relative to nonadjudicative ones. See,
e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., Procedure and Outcome Effects on Reactions to Adjudicated
Resolution of Conflicts of Interest, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 643 (1980).
187 LIND ET AL., supra note 47, at 74. The RAND research group conducted thirty-
minute telephone interviews with plaintiffs and defendants in tort cases that had been
resolved in the preceding twelve months in three mid-Atlantic region suburban courts. To
control for selection bias, they contrasted each procedure with its most common
alternative, bilateral negotiation. The original analysis compared disputants' responses to
the three third-party procedures and found that perceptions of procedural fairness were
highest for trial and non-binding arbitration and lowest for judicial settlement
conferences. A reanalysis of the data compared each of the third-party procedures to
unassisted negotiation and concluded that, compared to negotiation, the average
procedural fairness scores were higher for disputants who went to trial or arbitration but
the same or lower for those who used settlement conferences. Lind et al., supra note 47 at
965-66.
OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION
neutral third party.' 88 Laboratory research by Heuer and Penrod also found
that arbitration was not preferred to nonadjudicative procedures such as
mediation or bargaining. 189 Similarly, the often-cited field research on labor
grievances by Stephen Goldberg, Jeanne Brett, and their colleagues found
that mediation was favored to arbitration. 190 Other field studies have also
supported the idea that disputants are more attracted to mediation. 191
188 Robert S. Peirce et al., Complainant-Respondent Differences in Procedural
Choice, 4 INT'L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 199, 200, 204-06 (1993) (finding that the modal
sequence of procedural choices was: negotiation, mediation, advisory arbitration,
arbitration, and then "struggle," which was defined as "pressure tactics ... employed in
an effort to get the other party to give in").
189 Larry B. Heuer & Steven Penrod, Procedural Preference as a Function of
Conflict Intensity, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 700, 704-06 (1986). See also
Austin et al., supra note 183, at 297 (finding that defendants were least satisfied when an
adjudicative procedure yielded an unfavorable outcome, thereby countering previous
studies suggesting that adjudicative procedures are the most preferred across all outcome
conditions).
190 Brett et al., supra note 77, at 264 (finding higher rates of satisfaction with
mediation compared to arbitration, in surveys of disputants and their lawyers across four
major third party service providers). In another study, researchers conducted telephone
interviews with 132 of 158 coal miners, 69 of whom used grievance mediation and 89 of
whom experienced grievance arbitration. Those whose conflicts were mediated reported
higher satisfaction on measures of procedural justice, control over outcome, and third-
party fairness relative to those who participated in arbitration. They concluded that
"disputants value the opportunity to control the outcome and to help develop and
negotiate that outcome," and that this may "explain why mediation, in which disputants
have both of these opportunities, is preferred to arbitration, where they do not." Shapiro
& Brett, supra note 184, at 1175-76. As Bingham points out, grievance arbitration is
analogous to the non-binding arbitration procedure offered in court programs. Bingham,
supra note 37, at 110. Nevertheless, those who used mediation rated their neutrals as
fairer, relative to those who used arbitration. Shapiro and Brett speculated that disputants
might find advisory arbitration preferable to binding arbitration because it grants them
outcome control but they concluded that "(b)oth of these procedures... may be less
preferable than mediation because neither provides disputants with both outcome control
and the opportunity to develop the outcome." Shapiro & Brett, supra note 184, at 1176.
191 See, e.g., David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, In Search of Control: The
Corporate Embrace of ADR, I U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 133 (1998) (reporting results
from a survey of Fortune 1000 employers finding that they had a strong preference for
mediation over more fact- and law-based procedures such as arbitration); Jennifer E.
Shack, Center for Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems Bibliographic
Summary of Cost, Pace, and Satisfaction Studies of Court-Related Mediation Programs,
http://www.caadrs.org/downloads/MedStudyBibliography.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2008)
(reporting on an ambitious examination of studies of a large number and wide variety of
ADR programs, primarily in state courts, and finding that "the vast majority [of
participants surveyed] perceived the mediation process and outcome to be fair. In
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What to make of the findings from the hundreds of studies across these
two research paradigms has proven to be a source of debate. In a symposium
edition of the Journal of Dispute Resolution, leading dispute resolution
scholars disagreed about what to conclude from this body of research. 192 In
the symposium's lead article, Deborah Hensler criticized the heightened
reliance on mediation by many state and federal courts, particularly
mandatory mediation, asserting that there is no clear empirical evidence that
disputants prefer mediation to adjudicative procedures, such as arbitration.
She argued:
The idea that litigants might prefer adversarial processes with the
opportunity to adjudicate civil disputes to less adversarial consensual
processes may startle judges and legislators who have enthusiastically
embraced mediation. But it is consistent with the observation that voluntary
court mediation programs rarely attract significant numbers of civil damage
lawsuits. Moreover, the idea that litigants might prefer adversarial litigation
and adjudication is consistent with a long line of social psychological
research on individuals' evaluations of different dispute resolution
procedures ... My question is whether legislators' and judges' choice of
mediation as the procedure that most gratifies these concerns is well
addition, most studies found that mediation participants were more likely to be satisfied
with the process and outcome and to find them to be fair[er] than those who participated
in adjudication").
192 Hensler, supra note 9, at 81. This debate has also been echoed in other sources.
As Professor Jean Stemlight has noted:
Professor Hensler concludes, based on her review of the procedural justice literature,
that disputants want third-party neutrals to resolve their disputes based on fact and
law. Yet, Professor Welsh, after reviewing the same studies, disputes Hensler's
conclusion that disputants view processes as more procedurally fair if they cede
decisional control to a third party. Instead, argues Welsh, such studies show that "the
locus of decision control is less important to litigants' perceptions of procedural
justice than process elements-voice, consideration, even-handedness and dignity."
With respect to mediation, Welsh has, for example, shown that the precise way in
which the mediation is set up can make a great deal of difference to disputants.
Jean R. Stemlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR
in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 681, 719 (2005) (citations omitted)
(quoting Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants' Decision Control in Court-Connected
Mediation: A Hollow Promise Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DisP. RESOL.
179, 187).
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grounded. When I look to the findings of the first generation of procedural
justice scholars, I see little to support this choice. 193
Others, such as Lisa Bingham, suggested that the empirical literature
points to a preference for arbitration over mediation, and called for further
research to clarify the parameters of this trend. 19
4
Given the controversy, Hensler raised an interesting question: "What
would a system of dispute resolution based on litigants' preferences-rather
than lawyers' self-interest or judges' beliefs about their appropriate role-
look like?"'195 Despite decades of research trying to answer this question, the
answer remains unclear. Surely, no single research project can answer all
empirical questions that courts or policy-makers might like to have answered.
To date, however, several reliable findings about preferences have emerged
from the corpus as a whole. For example, courts would be hard pressed to
challenge the conclusion that process is critically important to disputants-
often just as, if not more, important than outcomes. 196 It would also be
193 Hensler, supra note 9, at 81, 94. It is worth noting that Hensler largely restricts
her review to early research in the area.
194 Bingham, supra note 37, at 124.
195 Hensler, supra note 9, at 81.
196 The procedural justice effect-the fact that citizens care about the process by
which outcomes are reached, whether favorable or unfavorable-has generally been
found to hold across demographic variables such as race, gender, and well as case
variables (such as type of legal issue or amounts in controversy). MacCoun, supra note
167, at 173 (synthesizing the body of literature and noting that the procedural justice
effect has been documented across "contexts involving every major demographic
category in the United States"). As Nancy Welsh points out:
[P]erceptions of distributive justice generally have a much more modest impact than
perceptions of procedural justice... laboratory and field studies that show that
greater perceptions of procedural justice generally produce greater perceptions of
distributive justice, regardless of whether the outcome is positive or negative.
Occasional studies show that this effect may be reduced when the outcome is
positive, but also that this effect continues to be strong when the outcome is
negative. Some studies have found that variations in decision control have no or
much smaller effects on procedural justice judgments than variations in process
control ... and that process control may be "more important to people's feelings of
being fairly treated than decision control.
Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do
with It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787, 818 n.150 (2001) (citation omitted). See also Lisa B.
Bingham et al., Exploring the Role of Representation in Employment Mediation at the
USPS, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 341, 346 (2002) (noting that "researchers have
found that employee satisfaction is more strongly influenced by the perceived fairness of
the grievance procedure than by the perceived fairness of the grievance outcome").
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difficult to counter the more specific findings that disputants highly value
opportunities for voice, fair treatment by third parties, and control over
process, and that these factors heavily influence disputants' evaluations. 1
97
But, when it comes to whether disputants find adjudicative procedures or
nonadjudicative procedures relatively more attractive, clarity remains
elusive. And yet, given that court programs generally offer a single
procedure, they would especially benefit from knowing which of the two
models as applied to ADR (specifically, mediation or arbitration) is favored
(or, under what specific conditions one is favored over the other). 198
So, the questions remain. Is mediation favored? Is arbitration favored?
One way to begin to reconcile these conclusions requires analyzing the
methods used in the research relied upon to reach one conclusion or the
other. In fact, as argued below, many studies suggesting a preference for
mediation appear to have some methodological characteristics in common
that studies supporting a preference for adjudicative procedures do not share.
197 Welsh, supra note 196, at 791, 817-22 (synthesizing the research and noting the
reliability of the "voice" effect, and the importance of fair treatment and observing that
"procedural justice research indicates clearly that disputants want and need to... control
the telling of that story"); Korobkin, supra note 91, at 322 (noting the "widespread"
research finding that, "holding outcomes (especially undesirable ones) constant, people
are significantly more satisfied if they rate as 'fair' the process that resulted in that
outcome"); Conlon et al., supra note 157, at 1087 (explaining that "[o]ne of the most
consistent findings in the research on procedural justice is that dispute resolution
procedures that provide high process control (i.e., control over presentation of evidence,
and the handling of the "case" before a third party) to disputants will enhance perceptions
of procedural and distributive fairness"). But see MacCoun, supra note 167, at 184
(synthesizing the literature and concluding that research shows that fair process matters,
but that whether process or outcomes matter more "may not be answerable in a
meaningful, global way").
198 Perhaps there are no strong aggregate preferences to be found, in the sense that
preferences may be context-dependant. The research conducted thus far, however, does
not suggest that this is so-for example, remarkably few studies have detected
differences relating to role in the dispute (plaintiff versus defendant) or legal issue. See
Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 225-26 (reviewing previous research on the effects of role,
and finding, through laboratory research, that role in a dispute did not affect which
procedures were most preferred, only how strongly certain procedures were preferred);
McEwen & Maiman, supra note 106, at 248 (comparing mediated cases with ones that
underwent trial and finding no differences in case types).
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B. Why Do We Know So Little?: Challenges Posed by Previous
Research
Critics of the existing research have argued that it is challenging, if not
impossible, to draw any strong inferences from the laboratory research in this
area. 199 They argue that the simulations are diverse, ranging from criminal
and civil legal disputes to interpersonal conflicts or collaborative tasks whose
"conflict" dimension is questionable.200 They also claim that findings from
laboratory environments do not generalize to real-life dispute resolution
situations. Part of this criticism can be explained by the fact that "some
methodological practices in [procedural preference research] are common in
psychology [and related social sciences,] but less familiar in [law], where
they are a source of discomfort[,] if not skepticism."'20 1 As Professor Robert
MacCoun has pointed out, however, it is critical to focus on the cumulative
rigor of the literature as a whole. "One can be troubled by the use of college
students, simulated conflicts, structural equation 'causal' modeling, or the
inherently 'subjective' nature of fairness judgments[,] [b]ut each of these
issues has received considerable attention by procedural justice scholars, and
the sheer heterogeneity of tasks, domains, populations, designs, and analytic
methods provides remarkable convergence and triangulation."20 2
Thibaut and Walker's original research program was conducted through
laboratory experiments and relied upon college students' assessments of
hypothetical disputes. These experiments "necessarily sacrifice[d] ecological
realism in order to increase the internal [or causal] validity of the hypothesis
testing ... which is essential in a domain where endogenous, reciprocal, or
spurious influences are plausible. '20 3 Most of the major variables of
subsequent theoretical interest have also been experimentally manipulated,
for example: the disputant's role (e.g., plaintiff vs. defendant); the evidentiary
support for each party; the third party's decision; the level of the disputants'
process and decision control; the decisionmaker's bias; the relationship
between disputants and their relationship to the third party.204 As MacCoun
199 E.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 961 (2001); Robert M. Hayden & Jill K. Anderson, On the Evaluation of
Procedural Systems in Laboratory Experiments, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 21, 21-22 (1979).
200 See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 199, at 1212 n.613.
201 MacCoun, supra note 167, at 173.
202 Id.
203 Id. See also Douglas G. Mook, In Defense of External Invalidity, 38 Am.
PSYCHOLOGIST 379 (1983).
204 MacCoun, supra note 167, at 173.
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points out, experiments such as these are vulnerable to threats to external
validity, but those threats are not proof of external invalidity, which is
ultimately an empirical question.20 5 And, indeed, "most concerns about the
external validity of the [procedural justice] effect (and its antecedents and
consequences) have long since been settled. '20 6 Indeed, a meta-analysis of
190 procedural justice studies, the source of psychological experiments on
preferences, initially appeared to show significant discrepancies between
laboratory and field studies; ultimately, however, this turned out to be a
statistical error.20 7
Reviews of the field research have also been replete with criticisms.
Field studies have been criticized for their limited utility for drawing
conclusions about causation because they tend to lack random assignment,
collect data from a single and perhaps aberrant court,208 or rely on data about
experiences with procedures that are left undefined by the researchers or are
otherwise difficult for the consumers of the research reports to generalize
from.20
9
One way to gain greater clarity from the existing research would involve
conducting a meta-analytical study. Meta-analysis typically involves
reviewing the relevant empirical literature, extracting data from an entire
series of studies that addresses a set of related research hypotheses, and
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id. (citing Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E. Spector, The Role of Justice in
Organizations: A Meta-Analysis, 86 ORG. BE-AV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 278
(2001)). See Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E. Spector, Erratum to "The Role of Justice in
Organizations: A Meta-Analysis" [Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes 86 (2001) 278-321], 89 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROGRESSES 1215
(2002) (presenting the correct data analysis and concluding that the corresponding field
versus laboratory correlations presented in the earlier paper were not significantly
different from one another). For an explanation of the "meta-analysis" procedure, see
notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
208 McAdoo et al., supra note 112, at 8 (noting that the program design effects
observed in the small number of studies conducted to date might reflect circumstances
particular to the courts studied and concluding on this basis that the reported effects may
not be found in other courts).
209 Brazil, supra note 96, at 101 (commenting on an extensive review of court ADR
studies and explaining that "reliable generalizations across the entire field are wholly
inaccessible because there is such diversity of program character and quality and,
presumably, in the character and quality of the studies"); Jennifer Shack, Mediation in
Courts Can Bring Gains, but under What Conditions?, 9 DisP. RESOL. MAG. 11, 11
(2003) (reviewing studies of mediation programs and noting that many do not provide
information on the characteristics of the programs).
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aggregating the data for statistical analysis. Thus, basic data or statistics
could be gathered from all of the past research on preferences, from
laboratory studies and field studies alike, and combined into one analysis that
would test for overall effects. Though a very complicated and ambitious
undertaking, the benefit of this kind of structured analysis outweighs the
challenges; it can explain statistically the actual trend across studies. It can
accomplish this goal for several reasons. First, it can help to overcome the
problem of reduced power in studies with small sample sizes; analyzing the
results from a group of studies can produce more accurate and reliable
conclusions. 210 Second, studies with more participants and studies with less
random variation are given greater weight than smaller studies.2 1' Third,
some methodological weaknesses in studies can be corrected statistically.212
For these reasons, meta-analysis is the ideal way to get a reliable global
picture from the body of research that already exists.
Greater clarification can also be accomplished by future research.
Researchers might focus on filling in some of the blanks in the literature by
conducting experiments in the field, which would allow them to draw
conclusions about causation. The best way to accomplish this goal would be
through field studies that randomly assign real disputants to different
procedures.213 Random assignment is the best way to create groups that are
reasonably equivalent on all known variables (e.g., age of disputant, nature of
relationship between the disputants, case type) as well as unknown or
unmeasured variables (e.g., psychological functioning of disputants).2 14
Thus, comparisons of post-experience preferences across groups assigned to
different procedures would allow us to conclude that preferences were in fact
210 Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases, supra note 106, at
647 n.17 (noting that meta-analysis is particularly helpful in ascertaining the overall
effect of a particular factor when the pattern of findings differs greatly across courts).
211 Id
212 Id
213 John S. Connolly, A Dose of Social Science: Support for the Use of Summary
Jury Trials as a Form of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1419, 1426 (1999).
214 Barton Poulson, A Third Voice: A Review of Empirical Research on the
Psychological Outcomes of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REv. 167, 169-70
(describing the value of random assignment in the context of psychological outcomes of
restorative justice procedures); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Some Suggestions for the
Critical Appraisal of a More Active Jury, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 234 (1990) ("Especially
important for concerns about internal validity is whether trials are randomly assigned to
either include the procedure or not, thereby allowing a valid comparison between the two
groups.").
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due to the procedure that was experienced rather than to some third variable
associated with another factor-for example, selection bias. The multi-door
courthouses which offer disputants a choice from among multiple procedures
are ideal existing laboratories for such research. Because satisfaction ratings
are meaningful only in a comparative context (one procedure preferred more
or less compared to another), they offer the means to hold geographical
location and court constant and examine differences across different
procedures. 215
Thus far, ADR field research using random assignment has been rare.216
Its rarity is unfortunate given the greatness of its value. A good example of
the benefits of random assignment comes from a study of summary jury trials
specifically.217 Since their inception, summary jury trials (SJT) appeared to
be a successful means of promoting settlement. Studies suggested that
approximately 95% of cases tried before summary juries end up settling.218
Some critics claimed that this figure was somewhat misleading because
studies show that, in fact, over 90% of all cases settle before trial.219 The sole
experimental study on SJTs published to date helped to shed light on the
debate. A court in Minnesota randomly assigned civil cases to either a
control group of cases that were designated as ineligible for ADR (control
group), an experimental group of cases eligible for mediation-arbitration
(med-arb), or a second experimental group of cases eligible for a SJT. 220
Cases were selected from the major civil cases that were filed and placed on
a "standard" case track. Results indicated that 4.1% of the med-arb cases and
10% of the control cases went to full trial, whereas only 3.6% of SJT cases
did so. Although this study did not demonstrate that SJTs produce
significantly higher settlement rates than the med-arb option, the settlement
rates for disputes undergoing SJTs were in fact higher than rates for disputes
that did not undergo ADR at all. Random assignment of cases to procedures
helped to ensure that selection bias did not confound the results. Without
random assignment, we could not be certain, for example, that the superior
settlement rates were due to the experience of ADR itself-after all, it might
have been the case that parties with less complicated disputes were
215 Hensler, supra note 9, at nn. 8-9.
216 Deborah R. Hensler, Court-Annexed ADR, in DONOVAN LEIsURE NEWTON &
IRviNE ADR PRACTICE BOOK 351-67 (J.H. Wilkinson ed., Wiley Law Publications 1990)
(explaining why random assignment is rare in court ADR studies).
217 Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 249.
218 Connolly, supra note 213, at 1452.
219 Id
220 Id. at 1430.
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systematically choosing ADR rather than trial, and that the relative simplicity
of the cases produced the higher settlement rates. Using a similar
methodology to study disputants' judgments of a variety of ADR procedures
could greatly enhance our understanding of preferences by eliminating
possible confounds in earlier research.221
Thus far, this Article has reviewed critiques on the basis of ideal social
scientific methodology and statistics, such as random assignment, which are
issues that might be raised in evaluating almost any empirical study. But the
research on procedural preferences specifically has some additional issues
that deserve consideration. Some of these issues relate to certain
methodological differences found across studies, which might explain some
of the variability in findings from past research. Specifically, studies tend to
differ in the types of disputes that they examine (i.e., legal versus non-legal
disputes), and in whether they examine pre-experience preferences or
preferences formed after experiencing a procedure for a given dispute. In
addition, past studies vary with respect to when in the history of the ADR
movement they were conducted. They also vary in how the procedures are
described or labeled to the participants. Each of these factors are elaborated
on below.
1. Legal vs. Non-legal Issues
In attempting to explain why some studies have found a preference for
adjudicative procedures (e.g., arbitration) whereas others suggest a
preference for nonadjudicative ones (e.g., mediation), some researchers have
argued that the distinction can be explained by the variation in the issues that
were evaluated by the participants in these studies. In particular, they argue
that studies finding a general preference for adjudicative procedures used
221 In an elaborate quasi-experiment, researchers could also test for the possible
effects of random assignment itself. That is, researchers could randomly assign a subset
of participants to the various procedures available in a given court and compare
disputants' evaluations of those procedures with evaluations offered by another subset of
participants who selected those procedures for themselves. Researchers could compare
statistically the evaluations of those who selected mediation with those who were
randomly assigned to mediation, and compare those who selected arbitration with those
who were randomly assigned to arbitration. With the same dataset researchers could also
test for the overall effects of "procedure type" by comparing everyone who experienced
mediation with everyone who experienced arbitration. Such a study would be useful for
understanding how much importance disputants attach to the ability to choose their own
procedure, how much they like different procedures, and whether the value they attach to
their ability to choose procedures is dependent on the procedure that they use.
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"legal" dispute fact patterns whereas those finding a preference for less
adjudicative ones used "non-legal" ones 222 (that is, ones that are purely
interpersonal and do not implicate legal rights).223 This analytical distinction
is problematic for several reasons. First, researchers tend to define and
qualify a dispute as "legal" in different ways, possibly because some do not
have the legal training required to properly make such classifications. For
example, one study classified a landlord-tenant dispute over a monetary loss
as a merely "interpersonal"-i.e., non-legal--dispute. 224 Yet, in practice,
landlord-tenant law is a legal specialization, and some jurisdictions even
house landlord-tenant courts.225 Second, the analysis seems overly simplistic.
Some studies of non-legal disputes have found a preference for adjudicative
procedures, and some studies of legal scenarios have failed to find a
preference for adjudicative procedures. 226 Nevertheless, it would be worth
exploring the legal/non-legal distinction more systematically by
incorporating it as a variable in a meta-analysis to determine whether it
explains a significant amount of variance in preferences across studies.
222 For example, in a study of how people chose to resolve a "real interpersonal
dispute" they had "recently experienced," 87.4% of participants reported using
procedures such as persuasion or negotiation more than the third-party procedures (i.e.,
mediation and arbitration). E. Allan Lind et al., Procedural Context and Culture:
Variation in the Antecedents of Procedural Justice Judgments, 73 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 770 (1997). In this study, participants were free to discuss a non-
legal dispute. Also, this study concerned procedural choices (which may be a function of
resources such as time or money) rather than procedural preferences (which are perceived
ideals for resolving a dispute).
223 E. Allan Lind et al., And Justice for All: Ethnicity, Gender, and Preferences for
Dispute Resolution Procedures, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 269, 276-81 (1994). In this
study, participants "were asked to recall and briefly describe an interpersonal dispute they
had had with someone in the past." They were then given descriptions of seven dispute
resolution procedures and were asked to rate the extent to which they had used each to
resolve the dispute. They concluded that participants in all four ethnic groups gave
"relatively high ratings to persuasion and negotiation, moderate ratings to social
influence, ignoring the problem, and mediation, and relatively low ratings for giving in
and arbitration" and that "women preferred negotiation to persuasion and men preferred
persuasion to negotiation, but for both genders both persuasion and negotiation were
much preferred to the other procedures."
224 Peirce et al., supra note 188, at 202-03.
225 See e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Multiculturalism and the Willingness of Citizens to Defer
to Law and to Legal Authorities, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 983, 984 (2000) (noting that
landlord-tenant disputes are handled in small-claims courts); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Beyond
the Pronoun: Toward an Anti-Subordinating Method of Process, 10 TEx. J. WOMEN & L.
1, 16 n.80 (2000) (discussing landlord-tenant courts).
226 Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 221.
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Moreover, when reporting their findings, researchers conducting laboratory
research should describe their hypothetical dispute scenarios in greater detail
so that consumers of their research can assess the nature of the underlying
conflicts that were studied.
2. Ex Ante vs. Ex Post Preferences
Temporal differences might also help to explain the conflicting
conclusions in regards to preferences. 227 There seems to be a nearly universal
practice among empirical scholars of studying preferences at the time of a
dispute, or after the dispute is resolved, but not both.228 Several scholars have
discussed the possibility that ex ante (pre-experience) and ex post (post-
experience) preferences differ-that is, that preferences before a dispute
arises or at the time a dispute arises, differ from preferences (based on
evaluation) after the procedure has ended.229 And although some empirical
projects have measured assessments of a single procedure at various points in
time, 230 or of several procedures at several points in time after the procedures
227 See supra note 197.
228 Hay, supra note 93, at 1804.
229 See, e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 199, at 1209-10 (noting the perils of
failing to appreciate the difference between the ex post view and the ex ante view with
respect to the perceived attractiveness of various policies); Hay, supra note 93, at 1805
(arguing that considerations of individual welfare maximization, "justice to the litigant,"
respect for disputant, "autonomy and welfare," and distributional fairness favor giving
priority to ex ante preferences); Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 213-14 (arguing that "pre-
experience procedural preferences contrast with ... post-experience preferences or
evaluations of procedures... the conclusions drawn from the [pre-experience preference]
research described herein are not necessarily generalizable to post-experience evaluations
and the preferences represented by such evaluations"). See also Stempel, supra note 161,
at 390 (arguing that "the party satisfaction measure and its temporal stability is an
important gauge of the quality of [ADR] ... there is data, but not definitive data... To
fully evaluate user views of ADR, there must be sustained examination that does not
measure party attitude only in the near aftermath when there may be either
disappointment or euphoria"). One empirical article noted in its literature view that some
studies have found a preference for mediation, whereas others have found a preference
for arbitration. Schuller & Hastings, supra note 182, at 132. The authors suggested that
the former tended to be field studies, whereas the latter tended to be laboratory studies,
and then also described the different results as a "discrepancy between selection
preference and post-satisfaction evaluations," explaining that field studies tend to assess
post-experience attitudes. Id. at 131, 133. They ultimately reported two laboratory
studies, neither of which examined post-experience preferences.
230 See, e.g., Welsh, supra note 103, at 579-80 (interviewing users of a special
education mediation program regarding their aspirations and evaluations of mediation at
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have ended,3 only one published empirical project has directly tested the
idea that the basis for preferences might depend on whether the inquiry into
disputants' preferences is made before or after experiencing a procedure.
This laboratory research, by Tom Tyler and his colleagues, was
composed of four studies hypothesizing that the decisionmaking processes
involved in developing ex ante preferences differ from those involved in
making evaluations ex post.232 They conducted experiments wherein they
asked participants to indicate preferences for resolving hypothetical conflicts
(thereby assessing pre-experience preferences) and then compared those
preferences with data from surveys in which those same participants were
asked to recall past conflicts-legal or non-legal--and report their
assessments for the procedures they used (thereby assessing ex post
evaluations). Tyler and his colleagues found that participants arrived at ex
ante preferences by choosing procedures that they felt would help them to
maximize their self-interest in terms of material outcomes. 233 In contrast,
disputants based their ex post evaluations on the quality of the treatment they
three points in time: immediately before the mediation session, immediately after the
mediation, and approximately eighteen months after the mediation session).
231 The few field studies that have investigated disputants' perceptions longitudinally
have collected data from disputants at multiple points in time after they already
experienced a procedure. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Mediating and
Litigating Custody Disputes, 17 FAMILY LAW QuARTERLY 497, 500-503 (1984)
(describing a study wherein disputants who used either mediation or trial for custody or
visitation disputes were interviewed three months after the end of their procedure and
again nine to ten months later); McEwen & Maiman, supra note 106, at 18-19 (reporting
on a study of disputants who experienced either mediation or trial which involved
interviewing disputants four to eight weeks after the mediation or trial, and interviewing a
subsample six to eighteen months after completion of the procedure); Neil Vidmar, An
Assessment of Mediation in a Small Claims Court, 41 J. Soc. ISSuEs 127, 133-34 (1985)
(describing a quantitative study of interviews with plaintiffs and defendants prior to
"resolution hearing" and then six to twelve weeks after each case was settled or
adjudicated).
232 Tyler et al., supra note 90, at 115-16.
233 Id. As Tyler points out:
Laypeople typically view themselves as reacting to their experiences based
upon the favorability or fairness of their outcomes. This self-perception of
motivation reflects their acceptance of the "myth of self-interest," the mistaken
belief that they are instrumentally motivated. Acting on this "myth," people make
choices among procedures based upon the gains and losses they expect from various
courses of action.
Tom R. Tyler, Trust and Law Abidingness: A Proactive Mode of Social Regulation, 81
B.U. L. REv. 361, 368 (2001).
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received during the procedure. In hindsight, they were more apt to favor
procedures that they felt treated them respectfully and fairly.234 This
difference in criteria ex ante versus ex post suggests that disputants may end
up feeling dissatisfied because their pre-experience criteria used for choosing
procedures do not match their criteria for post-experience evaluations of
satisfaction with those procedures.
Exactly when and how an individual's ex ante preferences for particular
procedures might differ from his or her ex post preferences remains a
critically important, open empirical question. The work by Tyler and his
colleagues did not focus on examining legal conflict, nor was it geared
towards examining how ex ante and ex post preferences might differ for the
very same dispute. It also did not test for the possibility that specific
procedures might vary in their attractiveness across the dispute resolution
trajectory. But, there is good reason to believe this might be the case.
Specifically, it appears as though much of the research supporting a
preference for arbitration has assessed ex ante preferences for disputes that
would be resolved in the future. In contrast, studies finding a preference for
mediation have typically gathered ex post evaluations from disputants who
already experienced a procedure to resolve an actual dispute. None of the
existing published research on actual legal disputes has systematically
followed disputants from the start to the end of their case to determine
whether pre- and post-experience preferences differed for the same dispute.
Although field studies may provide an accurate descriptive snapshot of what
happened in one or more courts over a certain timeframe, 235 they do not
capture the fact that dispute resolution is a process that unfolds over time,
and that disputants' impressions may change temporally. Similarly, typical
datasets produced by researchers (sample information for a restricted time
period) have limited utility for testing this hypothesis. At best, they may help
to answer a few specific questions about a single point in time. 236
With longitudinal data collection, however, researchers might illuminate
more subtle complexities of preferences. 237 This "timing" factor could also
234 Tyler et al., supra note 90, at 115-16.
235 Bingham, supra note 37, at 125.
236 Id.
237 Bruce Hay describes the dilemma that arises when disputants' preferences for
legal procedures ex ante differ from preferences developed ex post. Hay, supra note 93,
at 1849. He focuses his temporal conflict analysis by comparing preferences before a
dispute arises with preferences that develop once a dispute comes about, which
constitutes a different temporal analysis than I contemplate here. His analysis does not
extend to procedural preferences that might materialize after experiencing procedures,
once a given dispute has been resolved. Notwithstanding his different temporal interest, it
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be explored reliably by way of a meta-analysis, and, if it is found to be
statistically significant, it would support the idea that there are essentially
two psychologies of dispute resolution. There may be other moderators of
disputant preferences, but this one seems most likely in light of observable
trends in the existing literature.
3. Research Time Frames and Cohort Effects
Another factor that might help to explain the different conclusions with
respect to preferences is the time period in which the various studies were
conducted. A recent review of the literature on pre-experience preferences
supports the idea that studies conducted earlier in the ADR movement may
have found a preference for adjudicative procedures for legal disputes simply
because they were conducted at a time when nonadjudicative procedures
were not as culturally accepted or as widely used as they are today.238 Those
who argue that adjudicative procedures such as arbitration are preferred
appear to focus on older research. 239 The newer research-mid-1980s
onwards, which is clearly more relevant to understanding contemporary
preferences-generally suggests that mediation is preferred to arbitration.2 40
is worth noting his insight into the challenges associated with making parties to a dispute
use a procedure that neither party wants. He argues that:
[I]t is a problem of legitimacy and public confidence to have a legal system that
systematically frustrates the actual preferences or desires of the participants [which]
would have trouble commanding adherence to its decisions. Some sort of balance
must presumably be struck between what the participants "want" ex post and what is
desirable ex ante [which, he argues, is likely to be the preferences they hold before
they are faced with an actual dispute].
Id. at 1847-49. This, of course, is a problem of democratic governance in general, and
raises the issue of the proper degree of paternalism specifically, an issue which, although
it surpasses the scope of this Article, is worth due consideration. As Hay points out, "it
suffices to note that there may be considerable pragmatic limitations on the legal system's
ability to enforce hypothetical preferences over actual ones that the parties hold." Id. at
1849.
238 Shestowsky, supra note 9, at 246-47. See also Christine Lepera & Jeannie
Costello, Alternative Dispute Resolution: What the Business Lawyer Needs to Know, 605
PLI/LIT 593 (1999) (noting that surveys of in-house patent lawyers conducted in 1981
and again in 1991 indicated a 73% increase in "actual experience" with mediation during
the ten-year period, and observing that while only one-third of the respondents to the
1981 survey favored mediation over arbitration, one-half of those responding in 1991
preferred mediation over arbitration).
239 Id. (reviewing the relevant research findings); Hensler, supra note 9, at 85-95.
240 Id.
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Thus, a scholar's conclusions regarding preferences might depend in part on
the relative weight he or she places on older versus newer research.
As some legal scholars have noted, a few decades ago there was
considerable confusion regarding basic ADR terminology-in fact, the term
"mediation" was confused regularly with "meditation. '" 241 In that sense, more
recent findings suggesting a strong preference for mediation may, in fact,
reflect a cohort effect. Today, disputants (and the lawyers who guide their
decisionmaking) 242 probably have greater knowledge and acceptance of
mediation and other procedures as compared with the typical participants of
studies conducted years ago--ADR procedures are more familiar to
contemporary disputants, and are used more often. This increased familiarity
with certain ADR procedures may have contributed to a stronger preference
for such procedures. Thus, the dates of the research projects themselves
would be a useful variable to include in a meta-analysis.
241 Welsh, supra note 103, at 574.
242 Many commentators suggest that attorney views on ADR and settlement
influence disputant choices. See, e.g., Howard S. Erlanger et al., Participation and
Flexibility in Informal Processes: Cautions from the Divorce Context, 21 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 585, 593 (1987) (reporting on open-ended interviews with the disputants and
lawyers in 25 informally settled divorce cases and commenting that "Most of the lawyers
we interviewed say they feel responsible for encouraging informal settlement and will
pressure parties to accept settlements that they, as attorneys, find reasonable"); Russell
Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New Look at the
Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 82 (1997) ("our experiments provide some
illustrative support for the belief that lawyers have the ability-at least under some
circumstances-to persuade litigants to approach the settlement-versus-trial decision
from the lawyer's preferred analytical perspective."); AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L.F.
FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS: POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL
PROCESS 19-21 (1995) (discussing research suggesting that the lawyer influences the
lawyer-client relationship and that in some cases clients have little say in the management
and settlement of their cases); John Griffiths, "at Do Dutch Lawyers Actually Do in
Divorce Cases?, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 135, 156-58 (1986) (reporting a study that found
lawyers have great influence on substantive decisionmaking and dominate procedural
decisionmaking). Some argue that it is impossible for a lawyer to present options in a
truly neutral manner; how the lawyer frames the choices will affect how the client
evaluates them. See generally Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 1, 30 (1988) ("Lawyers who say they just provide technical input and lay out the
options while leaving the decisions and methods of implementing them up to their clients
are kidding themselves."). Of course, others argue that some clients think the proper
lawyer-client relationship is one in which the client is passive and the lawyer tells the
client what option to pursue. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER & SUSAN C. PRICE, LEGAL
INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH 186,197 (1977).
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4. Labels: The Problems of Mislabeling and Bias
Perhaps the greatest challenge involved in interpreting past research on
preferences stems from how researchers have labeled procedures in their
questionnaires. A common method used in laboratory research involves
asking participants to read descriptions of procedures labeled "mediation,"
"arbitration" and so on, and then to rate how attractive they find each
option.243 One source of what I call the "labeling problem" stems from the
variability in how procedures are labeled across studies. A significant
problem arises when researchers either mislabel the procedures they ask
participants to choose between or use labels that are mismatched to
contemporary versions of procedures. 244 In her criticism of some of the early
work by Thibaut and Walker, Deborah Hensler has argued:
[W]hat [some] researchers termed "mediation" most resembled non-binding
arbitration of the type mandated by many courts during the 1980s: the
parties (with or without the help of lawyers) presented the evidence that
supported their side of the dispute, a neutral third party heard the
evidence-but did not discuss it with the disputants-and then rendered an
advisory non-binding opinion. The third party did not caucus with the
parties or otherwise test their willingness to accept alternate resolutions of
the dispute, nor did he attempt to identify the parties' interests so as to
facilitate an integrative resolution. In other words, the procedure looked
neither like evaluative mediation, nor like facilitative mediation (and there
was certainly nothing transformative about it). What the researchers termed
"arbitration" was identical to the process they described as mediation,
except for the fact that the third party neutral rendered a binding
decision. 245
243 Tyler et al., supra note 90, at 103 (presenting participants with descriptions
labeled "ignoring it," "giving in," "using friends to pressure the other person," "trying to
persuade the other person," "negotiating a mutually acceptable solution," "using
mediation," and "using arbitration"); Lind et al., supra note 223, at 275 (presenting
participants with descriptions labeled "ignoring the situation," "give in," "persuasion,"
"negotiation," "mediation," and "arbitration"); Schuller & Hastings, supra note 182, at
132 (presenting participants with procedures that were called "mediation," "arbitration,"
and "adjudication"). But see Heuer & Penrod, supra note 189, at 703 (presenting
participants with procedures labeled "Method 1," "Method 2," "Method 3," "Method 4,"
and "Method 5").
244 Id.245 Hensler, supra note 9, at 86-87. Hensler continues:
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Thus, making sense of the literature requires reconciling the descriptions
the participants responded to across studies with the labels provided for those
descriptions.
This task is challenging because researchers do not seem to pay close
attention to the terminology they use to describe their procedures. 246 As
Deborah Hensler has noted, when researchers include descriptions in their
reports, one can sometimes find definitional variations that make drawing
conclusions across studies quite difficult:
[Some] experiments that claim to have found a greater preference for
mediation compared to binding and advisory adjudication (under some
circumstances) turn out to have used descriptions of mediation that better
resemble non-binding arbitration than mediation as it is typically used for
legal disputes. When researchers describe mediation in a way that aligns
with contemporary evaluative mediation, research participants favor
adjudication and mediation over other procedures, with similar
frequencies. 247
In these experiments the third party was a confederate of the researcher who
simply followed a script, listening first to the evidence presented by the parties and
then rendering a pre-determined and randomly assigned advisory decision. My point
is that the process simulated in these experiments looked little like mediation as
practiced today, in either its evaluative or facilitative form.
Not all procedural justice researchers have described mediation to participants
as outlined in the text. For example, in studies exploring differences in procedural
preference across cultures, Leung and colleagues described mediation as a process in
which a third party appointed by the court provides the disputants with "guidance
and suggestions" as they try to reach a "mutually acceptable solution through
negotiation and bargaining."
Id. at 87 n.20 (citation omitted). See Kwok Leung, Some Determinants of Reactions to
Procedural Models for Conflict Resolution: A Cross-Cultural Study, 53 J. PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 898 (1987). Using a hypothetical dispute concerning a traffic accident,
Leung asked participants in the U.S. and Hong Kong to evaluate four procedures:
bargaining, mediation, inquisitorial adjudication, and adversarial adjudication. Hong
Kong participants strongly preferred mediation to all other procedures, but they preferred
adversary adjudication to bilateral bargaining. Americans favored mediation and
adversary adjudication equally, and strongly preferred both to inquisitorial adjudication
or bargaining. Participants in both cultures perceived adjudication as the fairest
procedure. Id. at 903. See also Kwok Leung et al., Effects of Cultural Femininity on
Preference for Methods of Conflict Processing: A Cross-Cultural Study, 26 J.
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373 (1990).
246 Hensler, supra note 9, at 94.
247 Id.
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Field researchers face labeling challenges as well. Mediation is not
conceptualized uniformly across court programs. 248 Not surprisingly, usage
rates across programs also vary. For example, studies have shown that
although most voluntary, opt-in, court-connected mediation programs are not
used often, some programs have been very successful in attracting disputes.
For example, over 70% of all United States Postal Service Equal
Employment Opportunity complainants elect to participate in that
institution's voluntary mediation program.249 It is unclear why there is such
disparity in participation rates.250 Perhaps the difference is due to the driving
force of some particular program feature (e.g., style of mediation used, which
in this case is transformative mediation). Unless researchers describe in detail
the characteristics of the programs they study, it will remain difficult both to
discern what disputants evaluated and to reconcile the different findings
across studies.
Another possible reason for seemingly conflicting findings regarding
preferences relates to the use of the labels themselves (rather than to the
mislabeling of procedures). As psychologist Stephen LaTour and his
colleagues have argued, exposing participants to labels for procedures can
result in distortion due to differential familiarity or biased perception of those
procedures. 251 That is, if participants have a preconceived notion about
mediation, for example, they might see the word "mediation" on a
248 Of course, real-life mediations also vary in terms of features and styles, so they
should not be described exactly the same way in all studies. Problems arise, however,
when mediation is defined in an anomalous way that more closely resembles how
arbitration is typically conducted.
249 Lisa B. Bingham, Report, Mediation at Work: Transforming Workplace Conflict
at the United States Postal Service, IBM Center for the Business of Government, Human
Capital Management Series, Oct. 2003 (describing and summarizing eight years of
research on the REDRESS mediation program, based on more than 60,000 surveys). The
USPS' REDRESS (Resolve Employment Disputes Reach Equitable Solutions Swiftly)
program provides mediation for equal employment opportunity (EEO) disputes,
specifically those arising out of a claim of discrimination under federal law. Id. Studies of
the program suggest that at least 90% of the employees and supervisors report they are
satisfied or highly satisfied with various aspects of the process and that a substantial
majority of all employees and supervisors who have participated are satisfied or highly
satisfied with the mediation outcome (on average, 64% and 69% respectively). Id. at 23.
The program maintains a consistent voluntary complainant participation rate of 70-75%.
Id. at 15.
250 Welsh, supra note 103, at 594-95.
251 LaTour et al., supra note 182, at 323-24. LaTour defines "bias" in terms of
favoring a procedure simply because it happens to correspond to the adversarial Anglo-
American tradition, to which participants in studies are probably acculturated.
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questionnaire and provide a rating for "mediation" as they personally
understand or define it rather than responding to the description that is
provided. This potential source of inconsistency in what participants respond
to can inject noise into the data, thereby making their interpretation
unreliable. Although laypeople are generally more aware of ADR today and
less hesitant to express a preference for procedures labeled "mediation," for
example, perhaps due to familiarity alone, they do not, as a general matter,
accurately distinguish between the various forms of ADR.252 Even some
lawyers do not understand the core differences between mediation and
arbitration. 253 Such misunderstandings can also cloud data.
Given this problem associated with labeling, it seems methodologically
more prudent to offer research participants unlabelled descriptions of
procedures or, better yet, a list of options for the core features of procedures
(outcome, process, and rules). 254 Rather than bundling up the options into
configurations and asking participants to evaluate them in labeled packages
(e.g., "mediation"), they can be presented with different options for each
feature (which I call "feature options") and asked to indicate the
attractiveness of each.255 For example, they could be presented with a set of
options pertaining to the outcome (e.g., who would determine the final
outcome; whether that outcome would be advisory or binding), how the
process would evolve (e.g., how informal the process would be; whether
252 Lester H. Berkson, Mediation and Advising the Client, 2 NEV. LAw 22 (1994)
(arguing that "It is rare that clients understand the mediation process, particularly the
substantial difference between mediation, arbitration, and litigation"); Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, Representing Clients in Mediation: Principles that Make a Difference, 18
ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 41 (2000) (suggesting that many lawyers do not
understand the conceptual differences between adversarial lawyering and mediation
practice). See also Stipanowich, supra note 48, at 860-61 (discussing and critiquing
"expansive" applications of federal and state arbitration law and making the point that
there are still lawyers and judges who, sometimes through ignorance, fail to discriminate;
some federal and state court opinions have addressed enforcement of contractual
agreements to mediate under the rubric of arbitration law).
253 See Brown, supra note 65, at 329-30; McAdoo & Hinshaw, supra note 14.
254 For an explanation of why investigating preferences for rule options (in addition
to studying preferences for process and outcome options), see Shestowsky, supra note 9.
See also Hensler, supra note 9, at 95 (noting that "The question of whether (and when)
people prefer dispute resolution based on public legal norms to dispute resolution based
on ad hoc privately negotiated norms unfortunately has not been subjected to much
investigation to date" and explaining why this subject should be studied).
255 For examples of studies using a more direct approval, in the context of
laboratory research, see, e.g., Shestowsky, supra note 9; LaTour et al., supra note 182, at
323.
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disputants could express themselves conversationally or only in response to
questions posed by others), and the norms or rules that would be used to
resolve the dispute (e.g., whether the law would apply or the parties could
decide to use other standards).
This "indirect" analytical approach offers several advantages over a more
direct approach.256 One benefit is that it reduces possible distortion from bias
and differential familiarity with the various procedures.2 57 Moreover, it
avoids any evaluative implications of specific labels or titles, and therefore
facilitates the determination of relative preferences without the potential
noise introduced by labels. For that reason, "it makes possible a feature-by-
feature examination of the way in which procedures depart from a
participants' ideal procedural model. '258
This approach to studying preferences has the added benefit of allowing
researchers to determine which particular feature options drive preferences
for ADR procedures, which can help courts prioritize the implementation of
those particular options. Given the decades of research on preferences, it is
surprising how little we know with reasonable certainty about what specific
feature options disputants value most. The lack of clarity on this issue is due
in large part to the inflexible ways in which features have been investigated
to date. For example, when process control has been studied in laboratory
studies, it has nearly always been described to participants as an opportunity
256 LaTour et al., supra note 182, at 323 (describing some advantages). See also
Shapiro & Brett, supra note 184, at 1176 (reporting on labor study and finding that
instrumental voice effects can be traced to certain procedural features).
257 LaTour et al., supra note 182, at 323. In this study, participants were given a list
of options that could be used to resolve their conflict and were asked to indicate which
ones they would want incorporated in the procedure used for their conflicts and how
important each feature was to them. Id. at 327. The following options were studied: (1)
opportunity for evidence presentation; (2) desired level of fairness of the procedure; (3)
disputant control over outcome; (4) control of third party over outcome; (5) amount of
time a settlement should take; (6) certainty of approximation to the "best" possible
outcome; (7) certainty of a final decision; and (8) pleasantness of procedure. In order to
use this information to determine which procedures the participants preferred, the
researchers enlisted law students to match groupings of these options to existing dispute
resolution procedures. Id. Law students considered the following procedures: arbitration,
autocratic (a procedure in which disputants delegate decisionmaking authority to a
neutral third party who questions them and then renders a verdict), bargaining (bilateral
negotiation without third-party assistance), mediation, and moot (an informal procedure
in which all disputants discuss the matter informally and make a unanimous decision). Id
at 328-29.
2 58 Id. at 324.
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to control the presentation of evidence. 259 But in modem practice, different
procedures offer disputants a variety of way in which they can control
process, for example: by deciding whether to speak to the opposing party
directly or indirectly through their lawyers, by deciding how conversational
the exchange of information will be, and by deciding when and where the
procedure will be held. Despite nearly three decades of research on process
control, we still have little knowledge about what aspects of process
disputants especially like to control, since this variable has been
operationalized in this singular fashion. Future research can make great
advancements simply by examining reactions to a wider variety of process
control options.
C. Recommendations for Future Research
As the "state of the empirical literature" on procedural preferences
presented in this article suggests, some recommendations for future research
are in order. First, researchers should conduct a meta-analysis on the existing
literature to generate cumulative results and localize statistical trends in the
findings across existing studies. A meta-analysis would provide insight into
what can be reliably concluded from past research, and identify which
variables might need further exploration. In particular, the "timing" factor (ex
ante versus ex post preferences) could be explored more reliably by way of a
meta-analysis, and if it is found to be statistically significant, it would
support the idea that there are two psychologies of dispute resolution.
Second, given that courts generally offer only one procedure, researchers
should prioritize clarification of which procedure disputants, in the
aggregate, tend to prefer. To accomplish this goal, future research should
eliminate some of the ambiguity of past research. To that end, the best way to
minimize flawed conclusions about disputants' preferences is to rely on
empirical studies conducted on disputants directly, rather than on third-party
intuitions about, or reports of, disputants' needs. This can, and should, be
accomplished both in laboratory experiments (which are necessary in order
to draw conclusions about causal relationships between variables) and field
studies (which can support conclusions about ecological validity). Because of
their complementary attributes, a deliberate marriage between laboratory
studies and field research is essential.
Laboratory researchers should determine which feature options
disputants value most. To accomplish this, participants in their studies should
259 Shestowsky, supra note 9 (reviewing how the process control variable has been
operationalized in past research).
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evaluate unlabeled descriptions of procedures or, better yet, lists of feature
options, rather than brief descriptions of procedures that are labeled with
procedure names. This methodology would reduce possible distortion from
bias and differential familiarity with the various dispute resolution
procedures. Further, it would avoid any evaluative implications of specific
labels or titles. When reporting their findings, laboratory researchers should
also describe their hypothetical dispute scenarios in detail so that consumers
of their research can properly interpret the legal, or non-legal, nature of the
underlying disputes.
Field researchers could clarify preferences in several ways as well. The
biggest contribution they could make would involve conducting preference
research using random assignment. Actual disputants could be randomly
assigned to either mediation or arbitration, and the two groups could be
compared across a multitude of variables. This design could help courts to
understand the implications of offering one or the other procedure.
Additionally, actual disputants could be randomly assigned to one of two
groups--one group randomly assigned to mandatory ADR and another to
voluntary ADR (wherein participants could voluntarily select from a menu of
the same procedures that would be mandatory for the other disputants). This
design would help to disentangle the effects of disputant choice, which can
help courts understand the implications of choosing between a mandatory or
voluntary program. Courts with multi-option ADR programs are ideal
existing "laboratories" for this kind of research.
Field researchers should also describe in detail the features of the
programs for procedures they study so that consumers of their reports can
attempt to reconcile any different findings that might surface across
studies.2 60 Importantly, they should begin to investigate the potential
differences between ex ante and ex post preferences for actual legal disputes,
which may differ considerably and may implicate the values that courts seek
to promote in designing their ADR programs. This would involve conducting
longitudinal field research that assesses pre-experience and post-experience
judgments for the very same dispute. This type of research is notably missing
from the published literature.
Courts can, and should, be more involved in advancing the research
agenda on disputants' preferences. They can do so by gathering evaluation
data from disputants directly, and using it to shape their programs to better
respond to disputants' needs. If disputants modify procedures to suit their
260 For recommendations specific to mediation, see Shack, supra note 209, at 11-12
(providing recommendations for future research on mediation programs that could help to
illuminate which program and case characteristics make mediation most effective).
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needs, courts should also keep a record of these modifications and use them
as variables to statistically assess how much they affect preferences. Courts
can also advance the research agenda by welcoming academic researchers
who would like to study their programs for purposes other than straight-
forward program evaluation. 261
Naturally, it would be valuable to replicate studies from both the
laboratory and field paradigms in multiple locations around the country to
obtain more clarity on the reliability and generalizability of findings. It is
also essential that courts understand the limitations of the existing body of
research and how to meaningfully rely on the findings to improve their
programs.
IV. CONCLUSION
As Psychologist Tom Tyler has argued: "Legal authorities can both do
their jobs well and create public satisfaction. The key is to have a clear
understanding of what people want from the courts . . . The first issue
involved in knowing what citizens want from the courts is to examine their
preferences concerning how disputes should be resolved." The second issue
is for courts to implement those preferences, as I argue here. If courts
implement disputants' preferences, once such preferences are better
understood, we can expect voluntary court ADR programs to be used more
often, mandatory programs to be viewed as more palatable, and both
voluntary and mandatory programs to enjoy greater success in terms of party
self-determination, procedural justice, and compliance with outcomes. It
should also lead to greater respect for the legal system. These anticipated
benefits should motivate researchers and courts alike.
An interesting dilemma would arise if research ultimately unveils
substantial differences in ex ante and ex post preferences. If disputants have
preferences for certain procedures or feature options early on in the
resolution process, but then value them differently afterwards, courts will
face the dilemma of which findings to consider foremostly when they design
their programs. In such a scenario, it could be that courts with voluntary
programs that want to increase participation would focus on incorporating
options that look attractive ex ante. By contrast, courts with mandatory
261 JAMES L. SORENSEN ET AL., DRUG ABUSE TREATMENT THROUGH
COLLABORATION 90-93 (2003) (comparing local versus contracted court research in
terms of objectivity, scientific merit, and bias stemming from political influence and
noting that courts are "more amenable to listening to outside research when researchers
provide evidence that can be used to support their cause").
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programs that want to maximize the likelihood of outcome compliance may
opt to focus on findings that demonstrate what is valued most ex post. We
need to obtain a clearer understanding of whether (and how) preferences for
the same dispute differ over time so that courts can understand how to
interpret past studies which report preferences for only one point in the
dispute resolution trajectory. Clarification of temporal changes in preferences
can also help courts to appreciate the tradeoffs they are making when they
focus on disputants' needs at one or another point in that trajectory.
As Lisa Bingham has argued, "The jury is still out on what dispute
system design is best . . . in a court setting. Courts could ... essentially let
the disputants answer it."262 Indeed they could. They could rely on aggregate
data on preferences to determine which procedures to offer, once research
clarifies what these preferences are. More immediately, they could build
flexibility into their programs so that parties can exercise some of their
preferences on a case-by-case basis. By granting disputants' preferences
significant weight, either at the program design level, at the case-level or
both, courts can uphold the original goals of ADR and advance the potential
that ADR has for the future.
262 Bingham, supra note 37, at 125-26.
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